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In Germany, there is an ongoing debate about how to increase the efficiency of the social 
security system and especially its financing. The aim of this paper is to simulate different 
financing systems for Germany. The introduction of a Liberal British or the Southern Greek 
financing system increases inequality and poverty, as well as labour supply incentives. The 
introduction of the Social-democratic Danish financing system decreases inequality of 
incomes, but does not necessarily lead to less poverty. Tax payments are extremely high, 
whereas social contribution payments are relatively low leading to mixed incentives effects. 
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In Germany, there is an ongoing debate about how to increase the eciency of the social security
system and especially its nancing. Some economists argue that due to the open European
markets a lot of downward pressure weighs on the social security system, which leads to a race
to the bottom. The famous German economist Hans-Werner Sinn noted in an interview with
the German newspaper 'Die Zeit'1 that more nancial means are needed for redistribution in
order to compensate the losers of globalisation. But on the other hand, it is getting more and
more dicult to raise funds. Some argue that more privatisation of the social insurance system
is necessary to make the system nancially viable. They refer to the economic growth and high
labour market participation in Anglo-Saxon countries to point out the success of privatisation.
Others argue that the nancing of the welfare state is not a matter of nancing per se but
of the nancing structure, pointing out that the Scandinavian countries with much higher tax
burdens also display high growth rates, low unemployment and additionally less inequality of
incomes.2
In this context, Germany's nancing system of social security is often compared to other
welfare state systems and their nancing structures. Concerning the comparison of welfare state
systems, there are mainly four types mentioned in the literature for the EU15 countries: the
Conservative model based on social-contributions, the tax-nanced Social-democratic welfare
states with extensive public social security systems, the Liberal market-based model and the
Southern model.
Comparing the German nancing structure to the Scandinavian or to the British system,
the argument arises that too much costs on labour are caused by social contributions, which
increases unemployment. Apparently, the German system of nancing welfare has many dis-
advantages. The Harvard economist Stefan Collignon even claimed in the above-mentioned
article of 'Die Zeit' that the Conservative model of welfare provision has failed.
It seems as if Germany's European neighbours manage to nance their social insurance
systems much better than the Germans and that a lot of progress is necessary to make the
welfare state nancially viable. Predominantly, these topics and the comparison of dierent
nancing structures are analysed on the macro-economic level, but what is happening on the
micro-economic level?
In this paper, we analyse the eects of implementing three representative prototypes of
dierent welfare state regimes in Germany. We use the microsimulation model EUROMOD,
which provides the opportunity to implement dierent nancing systems in Germany (policy
swap). In doing so, the following questions will be raised: How are the income tax burden
1Cf. Rudzio and Uchatius (2005).
2Cf. Becker (2007).
1and the social contributions payments distributed between the dierent households? What are
the eects on inequality and poverty of dierent nancing structures? How does the nancing
structure aect the labour costs and the work incentives of dierent households in terms of
marginal and average eective tax rates? In this context, does the German welfare state
manage to keep up with its European neighbours, in terms of nancing social security?
The outline is as follows: The second section gives an overview of the comparative literature
of European welfare states and presents the main characteristics of the dierent welfare state
types. In section 3, the nancing structure of the respective welfare states is displayed as well
as the detailed nancing systems of each respresentative country of the four clusters. Section
4 starts with an introduction to the microsimulation model EUROMOD and the methodology
used for the calculations that follow. The substitution of the German nancing system by the
systems of the other three representative countries of the previous section, namely Denmark,
the United Kingdom and Greece, is simulated in section 5. Subsequently, the eects of these
simulations on the income distribution, on labour costs and on labour supply incentives are
summarised. Section 6 concludes.
2 European Welfare States
2.1 Typologies of Welfare States - Literature Survey
In Europe, dierent welfare states with individual histories and developments have emerged.
Their particular characteristics as well as their common grounds will be worked out in this
section. Welfare state systems that have many common properties and objectives can be
clustered.
Therefore criteria for categorisation need to be found. One possibility to group welfare
states is according to their levels of social protection in terms of gross welfare expenses as
a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, this approach only considers the
relative amount of expenditure spent for welfare but not the allocation of resources. Therefore,
it is also important to have a look at the structure of spending or the extent to which benets
paid are means-tested or paid on a contributory or universal basis.3 To also account for the
other side of the coin, the nancing structure, constituting to which extent the spending is
funded by taxation or social contributions, could have an impact on the welfare outcome and
could be an important criterion for categorising. Another option to dierentiate welfare systems
is to look at the welfare outcome, for example, in terms of inequality of incomes before and after
the intervention of government. The rst part of this section will give a literary overview on the
3Cf. Cousins (2005), p. 115.
2methodologies used to categorise welfare systems. The second part presents the dierent types
of welfare states, their characteristics and the countries that can be attributed to a category.4
The most popular work in the context of typologies of welfare states is the book of Gsta
Esping-Andersen (1990) "The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism".5 Esping-Andersen (1990)
criticises that most comparisons of welfare states focus on comparing the quantity of welfare
in terms of social spending as a proportion of GDP instead of comparing how the spending is
actually done and which parts of the population prot. In his view, a government just provid-
ing generous transfers to a small group of the population could be ranked to the same level of
welfare as a state in which the whole population is covered by the benets. Furthermore, he
does not consider a welfare state as the sum of social policies but as these policies being the
implementation of a certain ideology or institutional direction that has developed throughout
the history of a country. Esping-Andersen (1990) dierentiates three types of welfare states:
the Conservative, the Liberal and the Social-democratic one, by attributing certain charac-
teristics to each type and by scaling the countries according to these characteristics. He uses
two indices to categorise the countries' welfare state systems. First, he measures the degree
of decommodication that is to which extent a welfare state loosens labour from the market
mechanism; commodication meaning to which extent labour has the characteristics of a com-
modity; "...the concept refers to the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a
socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation."6 The index of
decommodication is composed of 1) the conditions of eligibility for social insurance benets
such as work experience, contributions or means-tests, 2) the strength of disincentives such as
waiting days for cash benets, 3) the maximum duration of entitlements and 4) the replacement
rates net of taxes for average earning levels. Esping-Andersen (1990) compares the combined
scores of the index of the dierent countries for pension, sickness, and unemployment benets.7
The second index he uses is the one of stratication. This index refers to the extent of support-
ing dierent social strata of people in a welfare state and the eects of government intervention
on social stratication. The index is composed of variables that in
uence the stratication
in the dierent regimes. The variable 'Corporatism' measures the number of distinct pension
schemes in a welfare state and 'Etatism' measures the expenditure on government-employee
pensions as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. A high value of these two variables refers
to a Conservative state with a high degree of status segregation and civil-service privileges.
4Although some Non-European Countries will be mentioned, the focus will be on the European countries.
5Titmuss (1998) already introduced two types of welfare states, namely the residual and institutional welfare
states, on which Esping-Andersen's concepts are based.
6Cf. Esping-Andersen (1990), p. 37.
7The values of the index are based on SSIB (Society for the Study of Ingestive Behavior) data les of 1980.
For more details on the exact composition of the decommodication index and for the dierent social policy
programs, see table 1 and see pp. 48-49 and p. 54 of Esping-Andersen (1990).
3In contrast to this, a Liberal state shows low values for these two variables but high values
for other variables like the relative weight of means-tested poor relief and the importance of
the private sector in pensions and health care. This is measured as the private share of total
spending for pensions or health care. The key attributes of a socialist welfare state as a part
of the stratication index are the degree of program universalism (calculated by the average
percentage of population between 16 and 64 that is eligible for sickness, unemployment and
pension benets) and the degree of equality in the benet structure (measured as an average
ratio of the basic level of benets to the legal maximum benet possible for the three above-
mentioned programs). By means of clustering, Esping-Andersen sorts the countries into the
three regime types.8
Decommodification Index Stratification Index
- replacement rate net of taxes - corporatism
- standard pension replacement rate - etatism
- number of years of contributions 
required to qualify
- means-tested poor relief as 
percentage of total social 
expenditure
- share of total pension financed by 
individuals
- private pensions as percentage 
of total pensions
- scores of first four variables added 
and weighted by the percentage of 
persons above pension age actually 
receiving a pension
- private health spending as 
percentage of total health 
spending
- benefits are scored double - average universalism
(For sickness and unemployment 
benefits: net replacement rates for 
standard benefits, the number of waiting 
days to receive benefits and the benefit 
duration, but the share of individual 
financing is omitted.)
- average benefit equality
Table 1: Composition of Esping-Andersen's Indices
Source: Based on Esping-Andersen (1990).
Bonoli (1997) points out that although Esping-Andersen (1990) manages to account for the
structure and the level of welfare provided within his decommodication index, his concept
measures the degree of decommodication as the most important objective of social policy
instead of concentrating on expenditure, "...it can be argued that this approach fails to re-

ect the substantial dierences which exist in the way welfare is delivered."9 Hence, Bonoli
8For more information on the scoring procedure for the stratication indices, see p. 77 of Esping-Andersen
(1990).
9Bonoli (1997), p. 354.
4(1997) introduces a two-dimensional approach to classify welfare states, one dimension being
the quantity of welfare and the other representing a measure of relative size of what he denes
as Bismarckian and Beveridgean provision. He distinguishes between Bismarckian social policy
based on social insurance, with eligibility for earnings-related benets depending on the con-
tribution record and the Beveridgean social policy with 
at-rate benets provided universally,
nanced by taxation. The two types of social policies have dierent objectives: the objective
of the Bismarckian system being income maintenance and the aim of the Beveridgean system
being the prevention of poverty. For the categorisation, the quantity of welfare is determined
by the social expenditures as a proportion of GDP whereas a high (low) degree of Bismarckian
(Beveridgean) provision is measured by the percentage of social expenditure nanced through
contributions. In the resulting two-times-two matrix, 16 European countries are sorted into the
four categories.
Leibfried (1992) distinguishes European poverty regimes typologically and historically to
analyse the perspectives of a common European poverty regime. In this context, he dieren-
tiates between four dierent social policy regimes namely the Scandinavian, the 'Bismarck',
the Anglo-Saxon and the 'Latin Rim' countries due to their system of subsistence in case of
unemployment and poverty.
Ferrera (1996) criticises Esping-Andersen's work in matters of the inclusion of the South
European countries, namely Italy, Spain, Greek and Portugal, into the concept of Conservative
welfare states. He agrees that there are some common traits between the two types of countries
but he focuses on four main dierences that he considers sucient to establish his own model
of Southern welfare states. First, he describes the Southern income maintenance system as
a dualistic one providing generous benets to some and no benets to other participants of
the labour market. Then, he attributes the health services of the Southern welfare states to
the Social-democratic model, and nally, he mentions the large in
uence of particularism and
clientelism on the systems in the Southern countries.10
Katrougalos (1996) presents the historical development and constellation of the Greek wel-
fare state system. Contrary to Ferrera (1996), he refers to Esping-Andersen's typologies and
supports his point of view that the Mediterranean countries conform to the Conservative model
and are just lagged behind in the development of their social protection systems but display
similar social and family structures.
Korpi and Palme (1998) distinguish welfare states with dierent strategies of equality. Un-
like Esping-Andersen (1990) and Leibfried (1992), they develop hypothetical welfare institutions
instead of aligning the ideal types according to real systems. They dierentiate their ideal-
typical models of social insurance institutions pursuant to the variables 1) bases of entitlement
10The section 'Southern Welfare States' will go more into detail.
5meaning contributions, citizenship or labour market participation, 2) the benet level principle
with the characteristic values being 
at-rate or earnings-related and 3) the employer-employee
cooperation in program governance which is a dummy variable. They introduce ve ideal-
typical models: the targeted, the voluntary state subsidized, the Corporatist, the basic security
and the encompassing model. The targeted model is characterised by means-tested, minimum
and similar benets for those below the poverty line. In the voluntary state subsidised welfare
regime mainly 
at-rate insurance-related benets are provided by mutual-benet organisations
supported by tax money. The Corporatist welfare state refers to the social insurance programs
introduced by Bismarck, with eligibility for earnings-related benets based on contributions
and occupational category. By contrary, the basic security model represents the Beveridgean
ideals of eligibility based on citizenship or contributions, 
at-rate benets or a low ceiling on
earnings replacement. Finally, the encompassing model with eligibility based on contributions
and citizenship provides universal programs covering all citizens.
Arts and Gelissen (2002) present an overview of the most important articles that followed
Esping-Andersen's publication and state the most important criticisms. They support the ap-
proach of Esping-Andersen but agree with Bonoli (1997), Leibfried (1992), and Ferrera (1996)
that there must be four clusters of welfare states, the Southern model being a category of its own
and not being categorised as a rudimentary version of the Continental model. Likewise, Arts
and Gelissen (2002) are of the opinion that Australia and New Zealand should not belong to the
class of Liberal states but should rather represent a welfare concept of its own.11 In addition,
they criticise that Esping-Andersen's typologies do not take gender issues into consideration.
Furthermore, they point out that every welfare state is a hybrid form of the ideal-types intro-
duced. Thus, the states are just put into a category they have most in common with. In each
cluster there are countries that implement a large amount of policies tting to the ideal-type
and other countries that could also be sorted into another category when focusing on other
policies.
Kasza (2002) comes up with a more radical critique of the whole concept of welfare regimes
and of the holistic view of Esping-Andersen's approach. Kasza (2002) suggests to concentrate
on a specic domain of social policy because policy-specic comparisons are more signicant.
In his opinion, countries change their welfare state ideologies and systems over time, which
results in incoherent welfare regimes:
(1) each welfare policy tends to change incrementally over many years; (2) dierent
welfare policies in the same country typically have dierent histories; (3) discrete sets
11Castles and Mitchell (1993) criticise Esping-Andersen's taxonomy concerning the inclusion of the An-
tipodean countries in the Liberal cluster and present an alternative categorisation with the Antipodes forming
a separate Radical cluster.
6of policy actors are involved in the various elds of welfare policy; (4) variations in the
policymaking process aect the substance of policy; (5) borrowing from foreign models
introduces diverse practical and normative elements into each country's welfare package.12
After the huge wave of articles that followed Esping-Andersen's "The Three Worlds of Wel-
fare Capitalism" (1990), Esping-Andersen (1999) responded to the criticisms that had come
up. First, he underlines that every welfare typology is a static concept representing a certain
point in time, not allowing for the description of future development of a welfare state and
the contingent convergence towards another model. Second, he defends his concept explaining
that the term of welfare regimes "refers to the ways in which welfare production is allocated
between state, market, and households"13 and that other authors as Leibfried (1992) or the
articles on gender issues misunderstood his approach and present dierent concepts. The only
aspect Esping-Andersen (1999) is reconsidering is the extension of his three regimes to four
regimes excluding the Southern model from the Conservative regime. Running a multinomial
logit regression to test the correlation of familialism14 with Southern welfare states in com-
parison to the correlation with the Continental countries, he does not nd evidence for this
extension.15 By means of logistic regression, he again presents the correlation between the
Conservative regime and its characteristics of corporatism and familialism, and the correlation
between de-familisation and the Social-democratic regimes.16 The Liberal regime shows a low
correlation with the variable corporatism and a high correlation with the percentage of private
pensions. In addition to his old concept, Esping-Andersen (1999) introduces an alternative
way to classify welfare regimes according to 1) the countries degree of regulating social risks
within labour markets with the categories little, medium and strong regulation; 2) the type of
welfare state, namely whether its system is residual, universal or social-insurance based and 3)
the dierentiation of familialist and non-familialist countries.
To sum up, criteria to categorise welfare states can be the conditions of entitlements to
benets or the nancing structure of social spending. Concerning the conditions of entitle-
12Kasza (2002), p. 282.
13Esping-Andersen (1999), p. 73.
14According to Esping-Andersen (1999), in familialistic welfare regimes, the family should be the main
carer. The state is therefore assigning most of the welfare services to the households, taking care only of those
welfare services that cannot be produced by the households themselves. By contrast, discussing gender equality
concerning employment possibilities in dierent types of welfare states, Orlo (2001) denes 'familialism', or
'familism' respectively, as women's dependency on family and marriage.
15He uses two independent variables for his regression: 1) high levels of welfare state servicing to families
and 2) high levels of family welfare burdens. He codes the levels of spending of the countries according to
the percentage of family services and benets provided as well as other factors like the percentage of day-care
coverage or home-help coverage. For more information on the method and the data used, see Esping-Andersen
(1999), pp. 93-94.
16Cf. Esping-Andersen (1999), p. 84. These calculations are based on the calculations for the stratication
index of Esping-Andersen (1990).
7ments there can be means- or income-tests for social assistance, poor relief, earnings-related
or other types of benets with dierent degrees of restrictiveness and stringency. The trans-
fers can be connected to varied regulations for the duration and the level of coverage. The
way these benets are nanced is in most cases connected to the conditions of entitlements
e.g. earnings-related benets depend on prior contributions. In the following sections, the four
above-mentioned types of welfare states will be introduced17 and their main characteristics will
be summed up.
2.2 Conservative/Corporatist Welfare States
Following Esping-Andersen (1990), the Conservative regimes have been strongly in
uenced
by the Catholic Church, monarchical etatism, traditional corporatism and Bismarck's social
insurance reforms. Their most important properties are therefore etatism, corporatism and
family reliance. The strong Corporatist traits of these systems are represented by the status
divisions as parts of the social security system subject to the dierent occupational schemes.
Especially civil servants are privileged and receive higher occupational benets. Social insurance
benets are based on compulsory contributions, thus they are based on employment. Non-
working wives can only gain access to social insurance through the male bread-winner, thus
insuring the stability of the traditional family. In terms of stratication there seems to be a
tendency towards the maintenance of the original divergence of occupational status. The levels
of benets are high but entitlement rules are strict. Private provision of social insurance plays
only a marginal role.
Another specic trait of the Conservative welfare state is the preservation of traditional
familyhood. The ideal type is characterised by a medium degree of decommodication, because
it is only high for the 'bread-winner' of a household and low for the youth and females because
of the prevailing principle of subsidiarity dening that the family is responsible for its members
in case of need. Only when the family's capability to assist its members is exhausted, the
government intervenes. Esping-Andersen (1999) calls this Conservative residualism.18 Unlike
the Liberal regime, the government in the Conservative system will provide social assistance
just in case of family failure and not for all that pass the means-test. Moreover, family benets
that encourage motherhood, day care or similar family services are underdeveloped. Active
labour market or training policies are marginal. Since trade unions have a big in
uence, they
ght for xing high wages. This does not only result in lower employment opportunities for
less productive workers but also in lower employment rates. European countries that can be
17Eastern European welfare states are not captured in the typologies listed here because they are not yet
implemented in EUROMOD.
18Cf. Esping-Andersen (1999), p. 83.
8attributed to this category according to Esping-Andersen's decommodication index are Italy,
France, Germany, Finland and Switzerland. With regard to stratication, Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, and Italy show the strongest degree of Conservatism.
According to Leibfried (1992), the "Bismarck" countries, namely Germany and Austria, are
institutional welfare states giving a right to social security and supporting social citizenship
with a focus on economic growth. They pursue a strategy of income compensation in case of
social problems instead of stressing full employment.19
The Corporatist model developed by Korpi and Palme (1998) also refers to the social in-
surance programs introduced by Bismarck with eligibility for earnings-related benets based
on contributions and occupational category. Korpi and Palme (1998) classify the institutional
structures of old-age pension and health insurance of ve European countries as Corporatist:
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy. Concerning the inequality in terms of the Gini-
coecient and poverty of disposable income, they show that France and Germany as represen-
tatives of the Corporatist model are placed in-between the encompassing (social democratic)
and the basic security (Liberal) representatives.20 Most of the Corporatist countries mentioned
by Korpi and Palme (1998), fall below the encompassing countries concerning the social benet
expenditures as percentage of GDP and again above the basic security ones.21
It can be concluded that although the dierent authors use dierent names and methodolo-
gies to describe the countries that mainly fall into Esping-Andersen's cluster of Conservative
welfare states, they all tend to go into the same directions and the hegemonic features are
similar: The Conservative model is characterised by the in
uence of the Catholic Church, the
fostering of traditional family structures and the principle of subsidiarity coming to the fore.
Income maintenance transfers are mainly nanced through a social insurance system from
which non-working women are excluded. The level of benets depends on the history of paid
contributions.
2.3 Social-Democratic Welfare States
Esping-Andersen (1990) identies the properties of the Social-democratic regime as focus on
employment, universalism, the comprehensiveness of risk coverage, and egalitarianism. Social
rights are extended and based on citizenship and not on contributions.22 The generous, univer-
sal benets and the minimisation of market dependency are represented in the high degree of
decommodication. The governments of the countries that are part of this cluster feature high
19Cf. Leibfried (1992), p. 252.
20Based on LIS data for 1985.
21Cf. Korpi and Palme (1998), p. 675.
22In this context social rights stand for the eligibility for benets.
9income-replacement rates across-the-board. This comprehensive socialisation of risks gives rise
to a crowding-out of private welfare. The Social-democratic welfare states provide a large scale
of services to their citizens such as income protection, health services and especially family
support, for example, in terms of income support for working women. As a result, female par-
ticipation in the labour market is much higher than in other regime types. Additionally, many
resources are spent for active employment policies such as training, retraining or employment
promotion programmes. Consequently, the employment rate is high. This broadens the tax
base. This and the high tax rates cause the high tax revenue in these countries. These types of
systems, therefore, put a lot of eort in redistributing and eliminating poverty. The provision
of social services is mainly nanced through taxation. Countries that belong to this group
of Social democratic welfare regimes according to Esping-Andersen's decommodication index
are mainly the Nordic or Scandinavian countries Sweden, Norway, and Denmark but also the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria. Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden
exhibit a high degree of Socialism subject to the stratication index.
Leibfried (1992) only mentions the Scandinavian countries in this context. Following his
approach, they emphasise "the right to work for everyone"23 instead of gearing towards income
compensation within the scope of their social policy strategies. A participation in the labour
market is subsidised, especially for women.
The encompassing model of Korpi and Palme (1998) coincides with the Social-democratic
one. It is characterised by eligibility for universal benets for all citizens based on contributions
or citizenship. They argue that this model has the biggest potential to reduce inequality of
incomes because it allows for the government to attain a bigger budget. As countries belonging
to this model, Korpi and Palme (1998) list Finland, Norway and Sweden. Presenting LIS
data, they also show that these countries have the lowest Gini-coecients and poverty rates of
disposable income in 1985 and the highest social benet expenditures as percentage of GDP.24
The characteristics of the Social-democratic system that coincide in the dierent literature
are thus the focus on employment and on the universal system of social protection with gen-
erous benets mainly nanced through taxation. The comprehensive state provision causes a
marginalisation of private welfare.
2.4 Liberal Welfare States
According to Esping-Andersen (1990), one of the most important characteristics of the Liberal
regime is the predominant standing of the market in connection with a minimisation of state
intervention. Strong individualistic self-reliance and reliance on the market with just a residual
23Leibfried (1992), p. 251.
24Cf. Korpi and Palme (1998), p. 675.
10provision of social-assistance are prevailing, which is measured by a low degree of decommod-
ication. Esping-Andersen (1999) sums up the main properties of his Liberal welfare regime
already introduced in 1990: Residualism plays a major role with varied relevance. First, the
Liberal welfare state is characterised by a very targeted form of social assistance with very
strict eligibility rules, stringent means- or income-tests and then modest universal transfers for
those who are eligible. As a result, the major part of the population is enjoying tax breaks
and tax exemptions when purchasing private social insurances. This stratication within the
population with just a minority of state dependents allows for comparatively low taxes to -
nance the transfers. Due to the low levels of benets and strict eligibility criteria, women are
encouraged to enter the labour market. Second, these types of welfare states are also residual
in matters of risks covered by social policies. Only 'bad' risks, as Esping-Andersen (1999)
calls them, such as those of the poor, are covered by the state, whereas all 'good' risks are
self-reliant in the market. Especially two key measures, the importance of means-tested social
assistance as a share of total social expenditure and the percentage of private pensions of total
pensions represent these main characteristics of Esping-Andersen's Liberal welfare regime: the
residualism on the one hand and the importance of market provision and encouragement of
private welfare on the other hand. Considering the index of stratication, there is thus a large
part of the population relying on private provision, whereas just a small proportion consists of
state-welfare recipients. Furthermore, the system is mainly tax-nanced and has modest social
insurance plans. With the exception of civil-servants, there are no separate social-insurance
schemes for dierent occupational groups. As a result of the incentives supporting a partici-
pation in the labour market, minimum-wages, if existent, are low and pension age is relatively
high. The countries that can be put into this cluster according to Esping-Andersen (1990) and
Esping-Andersen (1999) are mainly Anglo-Saxon countries.25 For Europe, Ireland and the UK
display a high degree of decommodication, but the UK shows a medium degree and Ireland
just a low degree of Liberalism in terms of stratication. The countries that have a strong
degree of Liberalism subject to this index are all Non-European.
According to Leibfried (1992) the English-speaking countries' welfare state system is a
residual one concerning income transfers.26
Korpi and Palme (1998) introduce two variants: the basic security model that represents the
Beveridgean ideals of eligibility 1) based on citizenship or 2) based on contributions. The very
heterogeneous rst group of countries with universal coverage and pensions for all citizens is
built up of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Switzerland. Ireland, United
Kingdom, and the United States belong to the second group that is based on contributions
25He mentions Australia, Canada, Japan, Ireland, New Zealand, the US, and the UK.
26Cf. Leibfried (1992), pp. 252-253.
11variant and provides less universal coverage. These countries have the lowest social benet ex-
penditures as percentage of GDP and the highest income inequality and poverty rates according
to Korpi and Palme (1998).27
To sum up its main features, the Liberal type of welfare states provides modest and residual
welfare. The strong reliance on the market prevailing in these countries causes a dual strati-
cation with only a few state dependents receiving modest benets that are subject to strict
means-tests. The system is mainly tax-nanced.
2.5 Southern Welfare States
Esping-Andersen (1990) does not regard the Southern European countries as a separate cluster
of welfare states, but as an immature versions of the Conservative cluster.
Contrary to his point of view, Leibfried (1992) introduces a fourth model. His 'Latin Rim'
or rudimentary countries are on the one hand also putting emphasis on residualism and on the
force into the labour market in some specications of their systems as the Liberal or Anglo-
Saxon countries do. On the other hand, they have certain welfare structures that developed on
the basis of traditions, such as those of the Catholic Church and that are completely dierent,
especially with regard to their labour policies that cause disincentives for women to work and
that often support agriculture.28
Following the approach of Bonoli (1997), the Southern welfare regimes are mainly nanced
through social-contributions (Bismarckian characteristics), and display a low level of welfare in
terms of social expenses.
One of the most popular articles describing the Southern welfare states has been written by
Ferrera (1996), as mentioned above. He criticises the neglecting of a Southern model in the main
literature on the political economy of welfare states, including the work of Esping-Andersen
(1990), and he reviews the treatment of the Southern model as a rudimentary immature Con-
servative model. He agrees to some parts of Esping-Andersen's concept that the Southern
countries welfare systems are to some extent lacking behind. In addition, the Southern coun-
tries have also been in
uenced by Catholicism, they show a lot of Corporatist traits, and the
traditional family still plays a major role. The systems of income maintenance as the pen-
sion system are mainly nanced through contributions and the fragmented occupational status
schemes are prevalent. However, unlike the Conservative system their income maintenance
system reveals traits of dualism. On the one hand, there is a generous protection for those em-
ployed in the regular 'institutional' labour market and on the other hand support for those that
are part of the irregular, non-institutional occupational sector is meagre. A national minimum
27Cf. Korpi and Palme (1998), pp. 674-675.
28Cf. Leibfried (1992), p. 253.
12income scheme for individuals or families is missing. In the area of health insurance, the South-
ern countries even tried to approach the Social-democratic concept in terms of universalism
and tax-nancing. Although none of these countries managed to introduce the tax-nancing,
the national health services are almost universalistic with access for all citizens. Furthermore,
Ferrera (1996) refers to the particularistic and clientelistic properties of the welfare state char-
acterising another dierence in comparison to the Conservative states. Particular groups have
a strong in
uence on the allocation of benets and on politics in general. Ferrera (1996) mainly
describes and gives examples of the Italian system, but he also assigns Spain, Portugal, and
Greece to the Southern welfare model.
Unlike Ferrera (1996), Katrougalos (1996), analysing the Greek welfare state system, points
out that it belongs to the Conservative model. He agrees with Ferrera (1996) that the Mediter-
ranean countries show some common institutional particularities. Notwithstanding, they have
even more fundamental characteristics in common with the Continental countries: The coun-
tries are in
uenced by Catholicism. The traditional family plays a central part in the social care
system. In contrast to the Social democratic model, social services such as child care are un-
derdeveloped and need to be provided by the families. Katrougalos (1996) describes the Greek
social protection system as a categorical and employment-based one. Within the framework of
the Greek pension and unemployment system, the level of benets is wage-related and deter-
mined on the base of paid contributions. Contrary to other countries in the EU, even family
allowances depend on previous salaries. In common with some other Mediterranean countries,
but unlike the Conservative countries, Greece does not have a minimum income support scheme
which shows the countries less comprehensive and lagged-behind welfare system. Ferrera (1996)
and Katrougalos (1996) both underline the disproportionate role that invalidity pensions play
in the Southern countries as well as the agricultural sector as an important employer.
Esping-Andersen (1999) reconsidered his approach but he does not nd evidence for a
fourth cluster and persists on his three clusters. However, he does not consider any of the other
features of the Southern model introduced by Ferrera (1996), except the one of familialism,
which Ferrera (1996) also describes as a common feature of the Conservative and Southern
regime.
To give a summary, the Southern countries can either represent a group of their own with
common characteristics such as a rudimentary version of the Conservative welfare system with
a lack of a minimum income scheme, a health system with universal traits and an important
agricultural sector or they can be attached to the Conservative model as a subcategory. The
Mediterranean and the Conservative countries have been in
uenced by the Catholic Church.
Their social protection system is mainly work-focused; the level of benets depending on pre-
vious paid contributions. Moreover, the social insurance system is occupationally segmented.
13In both models, familialism comes to the fore with emphasis on the family as being a major
part of the social care system.
2.6 Ideal-Typical Countries and Hybrids
The characteristics presented by dierent authors within each of the four regimes of the previous
sections show many similarities. Many concepts seem to coincide and several countries have
been put into the same categories. But still there are some countries that do not seem to t
into just one cluster. This section will give an overview of some empirical studies and present
the countries that are close to the ideal-typical models and those that can be called hybrids.
As presented above, Esping-Andersen (1990) clustered the European countries in terms of
decommodication and stratication as follows:
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC CONSERVATIVE LIBERAL SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC CONSERVATIVE LIBERAL
Sweden Italy Ireland Denmark Austria None
Norway France UK Finland Belgium
Denmark Germany Netherlands France
Netherlands Finland Norway  Germany
Belgium Switzerland Sweden Italy
Austria
Decommodification Stratification
Table 2: Esping-Andersen's Original Cluster
Source: Based on Esping-Andersen (1990).
Thus, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and Finland cannot be attributed to just one cluster.
Esping-Andersen (1999) illustrated an alternative approach, grouping the countries according
to three criteria. The rst criterion is the type of welfare provision, for which he dierentiates
between a residual, a universal and social-insurance type. In this context, the UK is attributed
to the residual and the universal category. The other two other criteria are the degree of labour
market regulation and the reliance on the traditional family as displayed with the corresponding
countries in table 3.
Concerning the empirical validation of the Esping-Andersen's taxonomy, several surveys
have been carried out to test the empirical robustness of Esping-Andersen's three categories.
Many studies with dierent data and testing indices have been conducted by means of cluster,
factor, component and BOOLEAN comparative analysis.29 Most authors conclude that there
are at least four categories of welfare states.
29See Kangas (1994), Ragin (1994), Shalev (1996), Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001), and Obinger and Wagschal
(1998). For an overview of these studies and their main results, see Arts and Gelissen (2002) and Arcanjo
(2006).



























Table 3: Welfare State Systems and Their Traits in Esping-Andersen (1999)
Source: Based on Esping-Andersen (1999).
Obinger and Wagschal (1998) make use of a cluster analysis with the original data to test
Esping-Andersen's typologies with respect to his stratication index. The results yield ve
clusters: the Liberal, the European, the Conservative, the Social-democratic and the radical
one. The most important dierence to Esping-Andersen's clusters are, on the one hand, the
radical countries Australia and New Zealand and, on the other hand, the European countries
represented by Belgium, Germany, Finland, Ireland, the UK and the Netherlands that are
supposed to be hybrids.
Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001) consider 58 features of eleven countries using a non-linear
principal component analysis to examine the similarities and dierences of countries included
in Esping-Andersen's taxonomy. The study supports the three regimes, with the exception of
the Netherlands being a hybrid model combining Social-democratic and Conservative traits in
its welfare system.
Soede et al. (2004) used a principal components analysis by alternating least squares to
analyse 85 characteristics of the social security arrangements in 23 countries based on data
between 1998 and 2001 of the MISSOC and MISSCEEC-database of the European Commission.
They dene ve regimes, the three regimes of Esping-Andersen (1990) with the exclusion of the
Mediterranean countries and the additional Eastern European regime. Again the Netherlands
are a special hybrid case. Furthermore Austria and Belgium are attributed to the Conservative
15regime.
To conclude on the empirical robustness of Esping-Andersen's classication, Arts and Ge-
lissen (2002) state that
Summing up, Esping-Andersen's original three-worlds typology neither passes
the empirical tests with 
ying colours, nor dismally fails them.30
Arcanjo (2006) compares the dierent approaches to measure und order welfare regimes
that have been presented in the literary overview of Arts and Gelissen (2002). Just considering
the twelve countries that were selected in common by all authors, she nds out that when
considering three types of welfare regimes, six countries always have the same classication
throughout the literature and when considering four typologies, fourteen out of twenty-two
countries are attributed to the same category.
Three Typologies Four Typologies
Type I: SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC Norway and Sweden Norway and Sweden 
Type II: CONSERVATIVE/CORPORATIST France and Germany France, Germany, Luxembourg and Japan
Type III: LIBERAL Ireland and UK Ireland, UK, Canada, New Zealand and the USA
Type IV: SOUTHERN Greece, Portugal and Spain
Table 4: Corresponding Welfare States in the Literature
Source: Based on Arcanjo (2006).
Thus, the countries in table 4 seem to be prototypes for the corresponding welfare regime or
they provide a benchmark concerning the characteristics described in the literature, although,
for example, Obinger and Wagschal (1998) consider Germany as a hybrid. Other countries,
especially the Netherlands or Switzerland, but also Austria, Belgium, or Finland can be at-
tributed to several types. Therefore, they are rather system mixes. The Southern countries
Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal can either be included in the Conservative cluster or represent
a cluster of their own, depending on the chosen criterion of categorisation.
Based on these categorisations of welfare states, the following section will take a closer look
at the nancing systems of the four European welfare types. Thus the Southern countries are
considered as a separate cluster.
3 Financing Systems in Europe
The previous section focused on clusters of European welfare states, which do not only dier
in terms of social expenditure, but also in the nancing of their social protection systems. In
30Arts and Gelissen (2002), p. 153.
16comparison to Esping-Andersen (1990)'s holistic point of view on a welfare state, this section
will follow Kasza (2002)'s advice to focus on a specic domain of the welfare state to compare
the welfare state systems, which will be the nancing structure. This section will present the
design, structure and importance of social contributions and income taxation in the above-
mentioned welfare state clusters and it will present these aspects in four countries, one of each
cluster, to give a more detailed example and to introduce the parts of the nancing systems
that will be simulated for Germany later on.
The nancing objectives of a welfare state are miscellaneous. Financing can have dierent
functions such as distribution, allocation or stabilisation, whereas the ranking of the importance
of these functions depends on the society's preferences as well as the mainly used sources of
nance.31 There are dierent means to nance a welfare state such as direct and indirect taxes,
social insurance contributions or fees and charges. Some tax breaks or allowances are similar
to transfers to the aected tax unit. Thus these instruments have a social expenditure function
and have an in
uence on the resulting income distribution, especially when considering tax
reforms. The way of nance and the balance between dierent nancing instruments reveal
who pays for welfare and, concerning the social security system, also how welfare is distributed.
Tax revenue can be spent for dierent purposes, but compulsory contributions are intended to
nance a specic purpose.
Conservative Social-democratic Liberal Southern
Level of Income Taxes Intermediate High Low Low/ Intermediate
Level of Social Contributions High Intermediate/ Low Low Intermediate
Main Financial Source of Public Social Insurance Contributions Taxes Taxes Contributions
Degree of Privatisation of Social Insurance Intermediate Low High Intermediate
Table 5: Financing of Social Insurance in Europe
Source: Based on Esping-Andersen (1999).
Bonoli (1997) focused on the nancing structure of the welfare states and clustered the
countries according to the level of social protection expenditure and the importance of social
contributions in the nancing mix. The resulting Bonoli-matrix, as shown in gure 1, considers,
on the one hand, the level of welfare provided and, on the other hand, the nancing structure
of the welfare system.
The four clusters of welfare states can be dierentiated in this manner: the Nordic cluster
with a high level of welfare provision in terms of social expenditure and a low percentage of
social expenditure nanced through contributions, the Conservative countries featuring a high
percentage of social contributions and a high percentage of social expenditure, the Liberal



















































Source: Recalculation of data from Eurostat and OECD for 2003.
cluster with low percentages for both dimensions and nally the Southern countries exhibiting
a high level of social contributions like the Conservative countries, but a low level of social
expenditure ascribed to their rudimentary state in the previous section.
3.1 The Conservative Model of Financing
3.1.1 General Overview
The Conservative welfare states provide a high level of public support measured by the so-
cial expenditure. As shown before, the Conservative welfare states are characterised by the
Bismarckian idea and are relying especially on contributions to nance social security. These
contributions are paid to governmental institutions, which provide social security benets, and
can be either a xed amount or a percentage of the wages. The entitlements for social insurance
benets are mainly conditional on the contribution record and on employment. For employees,
a membership in the social insurance organisation is compulsory and contributions to the funds
are mandatory and usually deducted from the payroll. Employers usually also have to pay ad-
ditional percentages to the contributions of workers. The insurance funds are often augmented
by government transfers from the budget. In the European context, the Conservative states
are characterised by an intermediate tax burden. The total tax revenue in per cent of GDP in
these countries is close to the EU average of about 40 per cent.32 Concerning the progressivity,
32Cf. European Commission (2007a).
18especially in Germany, Peichl and Schaefer (2008) show, taking social contributions and trans-
fers additionally to the income tax system into consideration, that Germany, but also most
other Conservative states, are ranked around the average of progressivity in Europe. Social in-
surance contributions are regressive due to the existence of ceilings, meaning that high income
recipients have to pay relatively low contributions.33 Contrarily, the progressivity of the income
tax schedule of the Conservative countries can be ranked to a high or intermediate level in the
EU. Thus, together with benets paid, social insurance contributions reduce the progressivity
of the income tax system.
3.1.2 The German Financing System
The German Income Tax In Germany, the taxable income includes salaries, wages, self-
employment income, investment income, rental income, income from farming and forestry and
other income sources. The German income tax system is a progressive system with rates
ranging from 19.9 per cent to 48.5 per cent in 2003. The solidarity surcharge of 5.5 per cent
of the income tax liability to nance special policies in East Germany due to the German
Unication is included in the previous rates. 7,235 e per year are tax-exempt in 2003. The tax
schedule is formula-based.34 The income tax liability for married couples holds marital status
tax relieves which are considered when applying the income splitting method.35 Implemented
in EUROMOD, there is a child tax allowance of 3,648 e per child in 2003 which is applied
when the nancial economies are higher than the child benet.36 Lone parents with children
are entitled to an additional tax allowance of 2,340 e per year. Expenses that have been
made to obtain the taxable income are deductible with some limitations. For individuals, this
includes all the expenses that are necessary to earn and maintain the taxable income and
those caused by the profession. In addition, some special expenses that are not considered as
business or professional expenses are deductible. Some are fully deductible, i.e. church tax,
tax consultant's fees and interest on taxes paid to tax authorities. And others, such as agreed
regular payments to dependants, education costs or donations, are partly deductible.37 All
expenses incurred in provision for the future, i.e. social insurance contributions or expenses
such as for life insurances, are partially deductible from the tax base up to a certain ceiling.
Social Contributions in Germany Unemployment benets, health insurance, long-term-
care benets, disability benets, old age pensions, and survivor benets are nanced through
33Cf. European Commission (2007a) and Peichl and Schaefer (2008), p. 12.
34For a denition of the formula to determine the tax liability, see OECD (2007), p. 229.
35The splitting method allows the following: To determine the tax liability of jointly assessed spouses, the
income tax is calculated according to half of the joint taxable income and then it is doubled.
36Cf. Grabka (2001).
37Cf. Grabka (2001) and OECD (2007).
19compulsory contributions which are paid half by the employer and half by the employee. The
amount of total social security contributions is limited by a monthly or annual ceiling. Earnings
that exceed this ceiling remain free of social contributions, which yields a regressive distribution
of the burden. The ceiling amount in Eastern Germany is a bit lower than the Western German
one.38 The average health insurance contributions rates in 2005 amounted 13.3 per cent, of
which 6.65 per cent were paid by the insured and the same percentage by the employer to nance
benets paid in case of sickness and maternity. The annual ceiling for these contributions was
42,750 e. In addition, the social security system is subsidised by the Federal Budget. In
case of employment injuries or occupational diseases, nancial support is paid by employer's
contributions. Family allowances are nanced through taxation. Contributions at a rate of 19.5
per cent to pensions and disability and 6.5 per cent to unemployment insurance are compulsory
for an income above 400 e per month and are paid half by the employer and half employee,
i.e. 9.75 per cent and 3.25 per cent by each. The contribution ceiling is set at the upper
earnings threshold of 3,850 e for East and 4,600 e for West Germany per month. Under
certain conditions, self-employed can opt out of the compulsory social insurance system. Self-
employed artists and persons in related occupations such as publishing professions are subject
to compulsory contributions paid to the Artists Social Welfare Fund. Membership in the
health insurance and in the statutory long-term care insurance is compulsory for employees
if their income does not exceed the upper limit of 3,450 e per month, above which no health
contributions have to be paid. In addition, students, disabled, pensioners, unemployed, farmers
and their families or children insured through their parents are compulsory members. Spouses
and children whose income is below 400 e are also covered by the insurance of the bread-winner.
Employees and employers each pay half of the health insurance and the statutory long-term
care insurance contribution rate, i.e. 7.15 per cent and 0.85 per cent of the wage for each.
3.2 The Social-Democratic Model of Financing
3.2.1 General Overview
The Bonoli-matrix re
ected the high level of social expenditure as percentage of GDP in the
Scandinavian countries, which presumes a high level of nancing. In 2005, Denmark and Sweden
featured the highest shares of total tax revenue including social contributions in per cent of
GDP in the EU. Denmark's share was 50.3 per cent and Sweden's 51.3 per cent. These two
countries were the only ones exceeding a share of 50 per cent. The universal welfare states of
the Scandinavian countries are mainly nanced by general taxes in order to secure a minimum
protection irrespective of a person's participation in the labour market. The Nordic countries
38Cf. Grabka (2001).
20do not only exhibit the most elevated overall tax ratios but also do they show the highest
personal income tax rates.39 Denmark had a top rate of 59 per cent in 2006. Sweden followed
with 56.6 per cent. Finland's top statutory personal income tax rate was 50.9 per cent. Only
Norway was ranked between Germany and UK with 40 per cent.40
Concerning the progressivity of the Nordic income taxation, Peichl and Schaefer (2008) show
that the tax payments of Denmark, Finland and Sweden are more equal than those of the other
European countries. Using the Kakwani-Index41, they compute a lower degree of progressivity
for these three countries. The reasons for this result can be ascribed to the comparatively
equal, even though high taxation which results not only from the tax rates, but also from the
relatively equal income distribution before taxes and transfers. Analysing the design of the
income tax, the lowest rates of the income tax schedule are already elevated compared to other
European countries. In Sweden, the income tax of the lowest income tax bracket is 20 per
cent levied by the state government plus 31.6 per cent on average levied by local government
in 2007.42 The numbers for Denmark for the local taxes are even higher at 33.2 per cent on
average, but lower for the state tax at 6.25 per cent for 2001.43 In addition, there are less tax
brackets than in the Conservative countries.44 From the results of Peichl and Schaefer (2008),
it could be assumed that higher income tax levels are rather politically feasible, if a broader
tax base and less progressivity of the tax schedule are implemented, which is the case in the
Social-democratic countries.45 Moreover, these high tax payments are compensated through
the high level of universal social expenditures.
3.2.2 The Danish Financing System
The Danish tax structure stands out in several respects. In particular, the heavy reliance on
direct income taxation in nancing the public sector, while social contributions play a minor
39Not being implemented in EUROMOD, indirect taxation is neglected in this thesis, although it plays a
major role in the nancing structure of most European countries, especially in the Scandinavian countries.
40Cf. European Commission (2007a). However, the situation of Norway diers from the other Scandinavian
countries due to the large amount of natural ressources.
41The Kakwani-Index is dened as the concentration (measured by a standard concentration index) of the
tax payments minus the Gini-coecient, thus the inequality, of the pre-tax income distribution. Cf. Kakwani
(1976) and Verbist (2004).
42Cf. European Commission (2007b).
43The rates for Denmark are taken out of the EUROMOD schedule. Cf. Hansen (2004).
44In Sweden, there are just two and in Denmark there are three levels compared to Germany where there
the tax rate is calculated by a formula and in Belgium where there are 5 or Luxembourg where there are even
16 levels.
45This does not mean that higher tax levels can easily be implemented in other welfare state types when
broadening the tax base and reducing the progressivity. As mentioned in the previous section, the historical
and political development and the society's preferences had an essential in
uence on the design of the income
tax system.
21role, is incisive.
The Danish Income Tax Although less than in other countries, as shown by Peichl and
Schaefer (2008), the Danish tax system is a progressive one. The taxable income is the net
income of personal and capital income, i.e. wages, company prots, fringe benets, national
pension, maintenance allowances (e.g. maternity or sickness benets), early retirement pension,
private pension, income from interest, and capital yields from a company minus all paid con-
tributions, and allowances. Contributions to private insurances are deductible to give people
an incentive to accumulate savings. All Danish residents have to pay income taxes and as in
the UK, the income is taxed on an individual basis. Notwithstanding, spouses can transfer
unused allowances to the partner. There are three taxation levels: the state, the county and
the municipality level. Altogether, they establish a tax scheme. Low income earners only pay
municipal taxes and bottom-bracket tax to the state, those with slightly higher incomes pay
municipal tax, the bottom-bracket and the middle-bracket tax, and those with the highest
incomes additionally pay the top-bracket tax on the upper part of their income. The local
tax comprises county, municipality and church tax. The local tax rates are dierent across
municipalities and counties. The average local tax rate in 2001 of 33.2 per cent included a
church tax of 0.7 per cent. State taxes are paid on income that exceeds the respective tax
allowance. There are three income brackets. In 2001 income from 4,486.59 e to 23,897.13 e is
taxed at 6.25 per cent, income from 23,897.13 to 37,195.69 e is taxed at additionally 6 per cent
and income above 37,195.69 e is taxed at 15 per cent on top. Taxes are levied on the income
exceeding the respective tax allowance. In addition, income from shares, i.e. yield and prots,
which have been held since at least three years, is taxed at a rate of 25 per cent for an income
up to 5,171.67 e46 and at a rate of 43 per cent above this amount. An unused threshold can
also be transferred between partners. The taxation ceiling without church tax and taxes on
income from shares is 59%.
Social Contributions in Denmark As mentioned above, social contributions in Denmark
are the lowest in Europe as most welfare spending is nanced out of general taxation, notably
personal income taxation. However, some social insurances are additionally nanced through
contributions. There are two types of contributions, i.e. most importantly the general contribu-
tions from the insured employees and self-employed at a level of eight per cent of the salary or
the gross earnings that go to the Labour Market Fund. Second, there are the contributions for
special pension savings paid to the special saving scheme. There are in principle no deductions
and no personal allowances for the general contributions. That means that everyone has to
46This amount has been calculated using the exchange rate of 2001 from Danish kroner to e.
22pay the eight per cent irrespective of the person's income, i.e. employee and self-employment
income.47 In addition, employers pay two per cent. One per cent of the gross wages and taxable
fringe benets, excluding pensions, are paid for special pension savings. The contribution for
the supplementary pension scheme (ATP48) paid by employees depends on the hours worked.
For less than nine hours of work per week no contributions are paid. For a full time work with at
least 27 hours per week the contribution was 120.09 e for the year.49 Moreover, a membership
in the unemployment insurance and early retirement scheme in Denmark is voluntary, but a
membership in the early retirement insurance is not possible without paying the unemployment
insurance as well. The amount for the latter was 378.81 e for the unemployment insurance
and 552.90 e for the early retirement paid on an annual basis. As mentioned in the previous
section, all social contributions are deductible in taxable income.
3.3 The Liberal Model of Financing
3.3.1 General Overview
Returning to the Bonoli-matrix, the residual character of the nancing structure of the Liberal
welfare states is shown by the low level of social expenditure in a Europe-wide comparison.
The UK and Ireland are relying more on income taxation than on social contributions and they
display low tax wedges between total labour costs to the employer and the corresponding net
take-home pay at average earnings levels.50 The total tax revenue of the UK for 2005 of 37 per
cent falls slightly below the GDP-weighted EU average, whereas the Irish total tax revenue is
much lower at 30.8 per cent in the respective year.51 The Liberal tax schedules are simplied
and transparent with a broad tax base and comparatively low tax rates on average. Concerning
the top statutory personal income tax rate, the UK (40 per cent) and Ireland (42 per cent) are
situated below the EU15 level but above the EU-25 average.
3.3.2 The British Financing System
The Income Tax in the UK The income tax system in the UK is an individual system.
For married couples, each spouse is taxed independently. Every resident in the UK has a
'personal allowance' for tax purposes, the amount of taxable income allowed to earn or receive
each year tax-free, which was 4,615 pounds (6,632 e) per year in 2003. For people aged over
65, the personal allowances is higher (6,610 pounds or 9,499 e in 2003) and even higher than
47Cf. Madsen (1999), Hansen (2004) and European Commission (2006a).
48ATP stands for Arbejdmarkedets TillaegsPension or Labour Market Supplementary Pension.
49For 9 to 18 hours 1/3 of 120.09 e and for 18 to 27 hours per week 2/3 of this amount have to paid.
50Cf. OECD (2007), pp. 11-14.
51Cf. European Commission (2007a), p. 4.
23for those above the age of 75 (6,720 pounds or 9,657 e in 2003). As taxable income rises,
the age additions are withdrawn. The tax system is characterised by a comparatively broad
base. Taxable income includes earnings from employment, earnings from self-employment, most
pension income, i.e. state, company and personal pensions, interest on most savings, income
from shares (dividends), rental income and income paid from a trust. The tax schedule is
unied and thus practical. It consists of three rate bands with the rates 10 per cent, 22 per
cent and 40 per cent.
The Working Tax Credit (WTC) and the Child Tax Credit (CTC) are part of the British
tax system, although they have the characteristics of benets. The WTC is a tax credit for
singles or couples who are employed or self-employed and work at least 16 hours per week.
The amount a person receives depends on the annual income. The person must be 16 or
older to be able to claim for tax credits. The WTC consists of several elements: A basic adult
element, i.e. 2,191.51 e converted with 2003 currency rates, which is paid if the above criteria
are met. Additionally, extra elements are paid e.g. if one household member works a total of
30 hours or more a week or for childcare. If a person qualies for the child care element of
WTC, this will always be paid alongside payments of Child Tax Credit (CTC). The CTC is for
families with at least one child. A family element is paid to any family responsible for a child.
The baby element is the credit paid at a higher rate to families with at least one child under
the age of one.52
Social Contributions in the UK Social contributions in the UK play only a minor role. In
the UK there are overall contributions paid for dierent social insurances. These contributions
are a nancial source comprehensively for sickness and maternity, invalidity, old-age, survivors,
and unemployment benets. However, sickness and maternity are to a larger extent nanced by
taxation. Employment injuries and occupational diseases as well as family allowances are com-
pletely nanced through taxes and also the unemployment insurance has additionally sources
established by tax nancing.53 Social contributions in the UK, namely National Insurance con-
tributions, consist of four classes. Class 1 contributions are payable by employees earning more
than 89 pounds, i.e. 127.9 e per week in 2003. Self-employed are subject to Class 2 and class
4 contributions which only entitle to basic retirement pension but not to short-term benets.
The ceiling of 3,664.4 e per month for individuals that have to pay both self-employment and
employment contributions is the same as for the employees. The classes dierentiate between
individuals that are contracted-out, i.e. who are privately insured, and those who are not. The
Class 1 contribution rate is set at 11 per cent if contracted-in plus 12.8 per cent paid by the
52Cf. Sutherland and Gutierrez (2004).
53Cf. European Commission (2006c).
24employers and at 9.4 per cent plus 9.3 per cent employer contributions if contracted out. Self-
employed that are subject to Class 2 contributions pay 8 per cent. Class 3 contributions are
paid on a voluntary base mainly by persons living abroad to keep their contribution record.54
3.4 The Southern Model of Financing
3.4.1 General Overview
Referring to the Bonoli-matrix , it can simplistically be said that the Southern model of nanc-
ing is characterised by a comparatively low level of social expenditure mainly nanced in the
Bismarckian way through social contributions. Thus, the nancial sources needed to nance
the expenditures are also lower than in other European countries, which is displayed by lower
tax and contribution payments. Concerning the progressivity of the income tax schedule in
the Southern countries, Peichl and Schaefer (2008) computed very high values of the Kakwani-
indices for Portugal, Greece and Spain, but a comparatively low value for Italy. The total tax
revenue in percentage of GDP is rather low for the Southern countries. Portugal, Greece and
Spain are all situated at about 35 per cent in comparison to the EU27 average of 39.6 per cent.
Only Italy has a tax revenue of 40.6 per cent, which is slightly above the average. The Southern
countries' level of the top statutory personal income tax rates lies between 39 and 45 per cent.
3.4.2 The Greek Financing System
The Greek Income Taxation In the Greek income tax system, the tax unit is the indi-
vidual, and the spouse's income is taxed separately. However, there are some exceptions, i.e.
several allowances and tax credits that are jointly assessed on the basis of a broader tax unit
including the married couple and the dependent children. Social contributions are exempted
from the tax base which covers taxable income minus various tax allowances. The tax schedule
is graduated and progressive, including three tax bands with lower limits of 8,400 e, 13,400 e
and 23,400 e. The respective tax rates are 15, 30 and 40 per cent. Additionally, the upper
limit of the rst tax bracket could be extended by 1600 e maximum for tax payers with in-
come from employment earnings and retirement benets. As mentioned before, the Greek tax
system comprises a number of tax allowances. For the system in 2003, four of these exemptions
are simulated by EUROMOD and will thus be brie
y introduced: 1) The mortgage interest
tax allowance enables the exemption of interest repayments of housing loans from taxable in-
come under certain conditions. 2) Charitable donations above 100 e per year are completely
exempted from the tax base. 3) The private insurance tax allowance is jointly assessed and
admits the full exemption of an amount of 1,100 e per annum. 4) The level of the child tax
54Cf. Sutherland and Gutierrez (2004).
25allowance in 2003 is set at a minimum of 1,000 e to a maximum of 13,000 e depending on
the number of children. In addition, if the head of the household's taxable income is below the
upper bound of the lowest tax band increased by the child tax allowance, the remaining child
allowance can be transferred to the spouse. Moreover, there are several tax credits that can be
deducted from the tax due. Eight of these are simulated in EUROMOD and will just be listed
here:55 Tax credits can be claimed for 1) medical expenditure, 2) education expenditure, 3)
mortgage interest, rent, 4) household expenditure, 5) maintenance payments, 6) families with
school children and 7) families in mountainous and remote areas.
Social Contributions in Greece In Greece, social insurance programmes are mainly funded
by contributions. Before 1993 all social insurances were just nanced by employees' and employ-
ers' contributions. Since 1993, some social insurance funds receive additional state subventions
and social sources.56 The unemployment insurance system and family allowances are completely
nanced by employees' and employers' contributions.57 All individuals have to be a member of
a social security organisation. The majority of employees and workers in the private sector are
directly and compulsorily insured with IKA.58 All members of IKA are subject to contributions
at a 
at rate of 15.9 per cent of their wages. In addition, employers pay 27.66 per cent of these
earnings. For 'hazardous' workers, i.e. blue-collar workers who have to do heavy, unhealthy
or dangerous work, extra contributions at 3.45 per cent of the workers' earnings are due, plus
2.15 per cent paid by the employer, because these workers are entitled to a pension ve years
earlier. For individuals that entered the labour market before 1993, a contribution ceiling of
1,960.25 e is set, whereas individuals rst employed in 1993 or later (and their employers) are
subject to contributions on the entire earnings. Civil servants and other public sector workers
are covered by a separate scheme. Their contributions are set at a 
at rate of 16.22 per cent.
Pensioners have to pay a 
at rate of four per cent for sickness insurance.59
Self-employed are covered by TEBE, the largest Greek social insurance organisation for the
self-employed, and are subject to lump-sum contributions depending on the insurance class. In
TEBE there are ten insurance classes that are applied for individuals rst employed before 1993
and there are additional ve classes for later entrants to the labour market, all according to the
pre-estimated self-employment income. For all individuals active in agriculture or in related
55For more information on the exact design of these tax credits see Matsaganis and Tsakloglou (2004).
56The state gives subsidies to the social insurance institutions to nance sickness and maternity, invalidity,
old-age benets, benets for survivors and benets paid for persons being aected by employment injuries or
occupational diseases.
57Cf. European Commission (2006b).
58IKA is the largest Social Insurance Organisation in Greece. It covers about 5.5 million workers and
employees.
59Cf. European Commission (2006b) and Matsaganis and Tsakloglou (2004) and OECD (2007).
26sectors such as shing that are residents in rural areas60, a membership in the agricultural social
insurance organisation OGA is compulsory. The OGA scheme is applied to employees and self-
employed. Contributions are set according to seven dierent levels of theoretical income. The
amount of contributions for the dierent classes was dened at about 8.5 of theoretical income,
which included 7 per cent for pension insurance and 1.5 per cent for sickness insurance. Since
contributors could choose their insurance class themselves, more than 75 per cent were in the
rst category in 2003.61
To sum up some aspects of this section, gure 2 displays the taxes, employee social con-
tributions and benets that would lead to a disposable income of 100 e in the four countries
that have been presented in detail. Concerning the quantity of welfare that is provided and the
amounts that are levied from the original income, Denmark is in front, followed by Germany
and then Greece. The nancing structure of Germany and Greece is characterised by a large
proportion of social contribution payments. Contrarily, the system of the UK and Denmark













Figure 2: Composition of 100 Euros Disposable Income, Average
Source: EUROMOD data for 2001.
Figure 3 presents the distribution of tax and social contribution payments for dierent
deciles, sorted according to the disposable income of the households. The high level of these
payments in Denmark is incisive, especially for the last deciles. These high payments can
rst of all be attributed to the Danish nancing system, but in addition, they are due to the
60Rural areas are dened as settlements with less than 2000 inhabitants.
61Cf. Matsaganis and Tsakloglou (2004) and OECD (2007).
27high market incomes in Denmark. Germany displays the second highest payments followed by
the UK. The low level of the Greek payments results not only from the tax and contribution
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Figure 3: Taxes and Social Contributions paid by Deciles
Source: Recalculation of EUROMOD data for 2003 and for 2001 for Denmark.
4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Microsimulation with EUROMOD
EUROMOD is a static tax-benet microsimulation model covering the EU15 countries. The
model can be used for a wide range of applications, such as the exploration of the eects of
dierent prospective or hypothetical changes in social and scal policy on the income distribu-
tion and on labour incentives, in terms of marginal and average tax rates. Policies that have
an immediate eect depending on current income can be analysed, as well as the eects of
hypothetical changes of tax or benet arrangements on the distribution of benets and taxes
paid and thus on disposable income. In addition, the costs of reforms can be computed.62
The model produces micro-variables at the household level, the main output being household
disposable income, which is determined as presented in table 6.
Parts of the income elements, such as employee earnings used for the calculation, are taken
from the survey data, whereas other components, i.e. taxes and benets, are simulated by the
62Cf. Sutherland (2001).







- cash benefit payments such as social insurance, disability, universal and social assistance benefits 
including state pension payments and near-cash benefits
direct taxes and social contributions without employer contributions
 - wage and salary income excluding employer social insurance contributions including sick pay paid by 
the government
- property income in terms of rent, dividends, interest but not imputed rent from owner-occupation
- other cash market income and occupational pension income such as regular private transfers, alimony 
and child maintenance but one-off lump sum incomes are excluded
Table 6: Computation of Household Disposable Income
Source: Based on Sutherland (2001).
model. Summary statistics that include the distribution of the income elements according to
decile groups and inequality and poverty indices can be generated. The decile groups are formed
by ranking the households depending on equivalised disposable income. The equivalence scale
used is the OECD modied equivalence scale that assigns a weight of 1 to the household head,
a weight of 0.5 to each additional adult member and a weight of 0.3 to each child.63
Data sources of EUROMOD are the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and
National Panels such as the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
One of the main ideas of EUROMOD is the comparability of the eects of social policies
across nations within a common framework. However, the model is limited to simulating policies
that are part of the database.
Concerning the usage of EUROMOD, there are some shortcomings: The model is static.
Therefore it does not allow for the computation of dynamic or long-term changes in policy
instruments such as pension policy. Moreover, information on social contribution histories
is not present in the underlying database. According to this, only a partial simulation of
social benets that are contributory is possible. EUROMOD does not incorporate the eects
of behavioural changes or substitution eects, since no reaction functions are included in the
model. Thus, the computation of eective tax rates is based on the assumption that the labour
market stays in a given equilibrium.64
There are three types of policies addressed by the model: rst, there are income elements
63This scale was rst proposed by Hagenaars and Zaidi (1994).
64Cf. Mantovani and Lietz (2006).
29that are covered by the model for which the values are just copied from the dataset, e.g. income
from property, second, there are income elements that are modied or partially simulated by
the model e.g. unemployment benets, and third, there are elements that are fully simulated
such as income tax.65
4.2 Methodology
EUROMOD oers the possibility to simulate a policy swap, which means that parts of a coun-
try's tax and benet system can be implemented in another country to simulate the results of
an introduction of the underlying policy. Concerning the nancing structure, the dierent coun-
tries within each type of welfare state have a lot of characteristics in common, but it is dicult
to build an ideal-type for each welfare type in matters of nancing. Therefore, representatives
of each cluster will be taken, whose nancial structure are noticeably dierent from the German
one. Denmark, the UK and Greece have been chosen, because they display comparatively large
distances from the German nancing system in the Bonoli-matrix.66 Denmark with its large
proportion of tax nancing is outstanding. The UK represents the typical Liberal European
welfare state and Greece is chosen because it is less developed than other Southern European
welfare states, and thus represents a more rudimentary welfare state. This might seem to be a
very simplied approach, but the aim of the simulation will not be to make general assumptions
about the establishment of a dierent welfare system in Germany, but to see some tendencies
and eects of changes in the nancing system, which are derived from the respective countries
and thus another welfare state type.
The comparability of the eects of the nancing structure in varied countries on the in-
come distributions is limited, due to dierent market incomes and dierent compositions of
the population. Therefore, the systems have been simulated with German data instead of just
comparing the systems in the respective countries to see 1) what the eects are for the Ger-
man population and not for the ones of the respective countries, and 2) what happens if just
implementing another country's nancing system without introducing its benet system.67
The simulated reform scenarios are not revenue-neutral. To establish revenue-neutral sce-
narios, some parameters would need to be changed in the original system, which would change
65For the instruments that are simulated or not in all countries see Sutherland (2001), p. 34. In some coun-
tries, there may be exceptions concerning the inclusion of instruments in the simulations, which is summed up in
detail in each Country Report available on http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/documentation/countries/.
66Ireland could have been chosen instead of the UK, but since it is often argued that Ireland is just a lacked-
behind-system, and since the UK are always considered as the main representative of the Liberal welfare states
in Europe, the UK seemed to be more adequate.
67This approach was chosen to see the separate eects of dierent nancing systems. It has to be kept in
mind that the tax and transfer systems often interact in reality. Atkinson (1999) analyses the eects of transfer
programs on economic growth and employment.
30the original structure of the respective nancing system. Moreover, there are many possibili-
ties to build a revenue-neutral scenario, e.g. the tax rates could be changed or the tax base
could be broadened. Therefore, the nancing systems are left in their original structure for the
simulation.
4.2.1 Modications Made in EUROMOD
The rst simulation is the one of the German system of 2003 (GE-2003), which provides the
baseline scenario all the other simulated systems are compared with.68 The other simulations
are done with the same data, the German 2003 database.
To be able to implement another nancing system in Germany, rst, all German nancing
policies, i.e. the German income tax and all the social insurance contribution policies paid by
employees and employers, have to be switched o.
The proceeding of the modications that are required for the computations with EUROMOD
is the same for every system69: 1) The policies of the respective country have to be inserted in
the German system.70 2) The German income lists have to be adapted so that they also cover
the new income components and neglect the 'old' German ones that have been substituted. The
tax units have to be modied, changing the denitions of the tax unit to the ones of the 'new'
tax system. If necessary, new income list and tax units have to be established71. 3) Country-
specic variables in the modules that are not dened for Germany have to be substituted by
adequate German or common variables, or the module has to be modied, so that the relevant
variable is not required anymore.72
As a second step, the British nancing system of 2003 is simulated with German data (UK-
Sim.). The policies introduced are the UK income tax, the UK general social contributions and
the working families' and child tax credit.
The third step is the simulation of the Danish nancing system of 2001 with German data
(DK-Sim.). In this context, the following diculties came up: The Danish special pension
savings contributions are not paid by disabled people, which is measured in the Danish system
by a variable declaring the degree of disability of a person that is also needed for the eligibility
68For some basic instructions on how to use EUROMOD, see Levy (2006a), Lietz (2006c), Paulus et al.
(2006), Mantovani and Lietz (2006), Levy (2006b), Lietz (2006d), and Lietz and Levy (2006).
69For some information on how to conduct a microsimulation with EUROMOD, see Lietz (2006a).
70The relevant policies, i.e. the ones of the income tax system and all social contribution policies, have to be
listed in the German spine in EUROMOD and they have to be added to the other policy sheets.
71For some information on how to do this, see Lietz (2006b).
72This can be done by describing the former variable by a number of eligibility rules or other circumscriptions.
If none of these two options is possible, values for the not-dened variable have to be inserted after doing a
sensitivity check with extreme values to get an idea about the quantitative eects of this approach. If the
variable is part of a module with no quantitative importance or if it is no at all computable with the German
database, the module has to be switched o.
31condition for disability benets. Since the occupational accident insurance is not yet included
in EUROMOD for Germany, there is no equivalent German variable.73 Therefore, the condition
is just neglected, assuming that there are not too many disabled individuals in the dataset.
In the fourth step, i.e. the simulation of the Greek nancing system of 2003 with German
Data (GR-Sim.), the following adaptations have been made: First, since the economic status
in Greece is lower than in Germany, e.g. in terms of wages, much more individuals pass certain
income threshold when simulating the Greek system with German data than with the original
data. Despite these distortions, the thresholds of the Greek system are kept to show the eects
of the simulation of the original system in Germany.74
4.2.2 Illustration of the Results in the Summary Statistics
The results of the simulations are summarised in statistics that are all listed in appendix C.
These statistics display the income components of the average individual within each decile. For
the comparison of the simulated systems in section 4.3, decile groups are formed by ranking the
households according to original income, to keep the same ranking for every simulated scenario,
and to avoid reranking due to tax, contribution or benet payments.75 Inequality is measured
by the Gini-coecient76, and poverty is determined by a headcount index that displays the
percentage of people with an equivalised disposable income below the poverty line of 60 per
cent of the median.77 Both measures are calculated on the basis of equivalised individual
data. The inequality and poverty measures calculated by EUROMOD are based on disposable
income without accounting for the employer contributions. Therefore, they are also computed
by including the employer contributions in the calculation, as presented in the following section.
In addition, the poverty indices that account for employer contributions have been computed,
1) with the poverty line of the German system of 2003 xed for all systems, and 2) with poverty
lines adapted to the respective systems. Since the poverty measures depend on the set poverty
line, they are overestimated in case of a higher average disposable income and vice versa. The
xed poverty line on the other hand does not account for cleavages of income of a society with
73Cf. Grabka (2001), p. 23.
74As argued in the previous section, the intention here is the analysis of the eects of a simulation of the
nancing system of a less developed welfare state. Since the major dierence of the Southern welfare systems
and the Conservative ones is just the level of welfare and nancing and not the structure, the thresholds are
kept.
75The decile groups of the summary statistics of the original systems are formed according to the disposable
household income as they are computed with EUROMOD. In addition, the statistics of the German system of
2003 and the simulated systems are listed in appendix C, with decile groups formed according to disposable
and original income.
76For the denition and computation of the Gini-coecient, see Gini (1921).
77Cf. EUROMOD (2007a) and EUROMOD (2007b) where these measures are used. For the measurement
of poverty, see Foster et al. (1984) and Atkinson (1997).
32a higher disposable income on average.
4.2.3 Denition of Disposable Income
The disposable income of the simulated systems is compared using two dierent denitions of
disposable income. The rst denition is the one of the standard computation of EUROMOD
for the disposable household income as presented in table 6:
HH DisposableY = HH OriginalY   HH EESIC
 HH Tax + HH Ben (1)
where HH DisposableY is the disposable household income, HH OriginalY is the original
household income, and HH EESIC are the employee contributions, HH Tax the taxes paid,
and HH Ben the benets received by the household.
The second denition accounts for the employer contributions of the dierent nancing
systems as they are part of the labour costs:78
HH DisposableY (ERSIC) = LabourCosts   HH ERSIC   HH EESIC
 HH Tax + HH Ben (2)
where HH DisposableY (ERSIC) is the disposable household income accounting for the
employer contributions, and the values of LabourCosts are computed adding the original em-
ployers contributions to the original income of the German system of 2003.
4.2.4 Computation of the Average and Marginal Eective Tax Rates
The average eective tax rate (AETR) measures the tax burden on total labour income as a
fraction of the tax base. For the calculation of the AETR, only employees in the working age,
i.e. between 16 and 64, are considered to compare the labour costs of the dierent systems. Self-
employment incomes are excluded, because they are by their nature part labour income and part
income from capital. In addition, the quality of the self-employment variables, especially the
tax and contribution payments, is not sucient.79 Social insurance payments of employees and
employers are included in the tax burden. Immervoll (2004) argues that the social contributions
78This exercise is done to account for changing employers SIC under the assumption that the labour costs
shall remain unchanged.
79Cf. Immervoll (2004) and Immervoll (2002).
33should be included because: 1) They are compulsory, 2) Although they are supposed to serve
as payments for insurance coverage in comparison to taxes which have functions such as the
raising of revenue or redistribution, there are cross subsidies in public nance that ease this
strict distinction.80 Since the tax burden on total labour income should be computed, the
employer contributions also have to be included in the numerator and denominator. Thus, the
computation of the AETRs is:
AETR = (EESIC + ERSIC + Taxes)=(TaxableY + ERSIC) (3)
where EESIC are the employee contributions, ERSIC the employer contributions, and
Taxes the income taxes paid by the individual. TaxableY is the taxable income set in EU-
ROMOD. Hence, the AETR is a measure for the tax and contribution wedge on total labour
income. The higher the AETR, the higher the payment burden that is loaded on the respective
labour income. Moreover, the AETR re
ects the decision of a worker with a potential income
of the respective decile to enter the labour market at all. These decisions are called labour
supply responses along the extensive margin (the decision about participation into the labour
force).81
The marginal eective tax rate (METR) serves as a measure of labour supply incentives
for the increase of work intensity. It takes all benets, taxes and social contributions into
account that are paid by the individual. Benets are also included, because they aect a
person's current cash disposable income and are accounted for, when the person decides to
extent working hours. Employer contributions are neglected, since they do not aect intensive
labour supply responses.82 Similar to the computation of the AETRs, the METRs are only
computed for employees. Consequently, the work incentives only refer to economically active
persons with an employment status. The METRs are computed as follows:
METR = 1   (4DisposableY=4OriginalY ) (4)
where 4DisposableY is the change of disposable income, i.e. the change of post-tax-benet
income, and 4OriginalY is the margin by which the original income increases. The margin
chosen here is an additional three per cent of employment income. Thus the METR measures
the work incentives of a three per cent rise in gross employment income due to additional
hours of working. The higher the METR, the lower will be the incentives of the employee to
work more. These decisions are called labour supply responses along the intensive margin (the
80Cf. Immervoll (2004), p. 9.
81Cf. Saez (2002).
82Cf. Immervoll (2004) and Immervoll (2002).
34decision about the intensity of work on the job).83
The average and median AETRs and METRs are computed for each decile group ranked by
the original income. In this manner, the individuals belong to the same deciles for each system.
The analysis mainly focuses on the median eective tax rates, because they are less sensitive to
extreme values. For the interpretation of the AETRs and METRs later on, it should be kept in
mind that they result from simulated systems, which are combinations of the German benet
system and the nancing systems of the respective countries, and cannot be compared to the
rates of the real systems.
5 Simulating Dierent Financing Scenarios for Germany
5.1 Eects on the Income Distribution
Having presented the methodology used, the next two sections analyse the major results. As
explained above, the simulated scenarios are not revenue-neutral, which needs to be kept in
mind when analysing the outcome of each scenario. The revenue of each simulated system (per
month) is displayed in table 7. The revenue of GE-2003 is much higher than the revenue of
the other systems. In Denmark, a lot of revenue is generated through indirect and direct taxes.
In DK-Sim., only direct taxes are included which explains the comparatively low revenue. In
DK-Sim., the tax revenue is the highest of all systems at 30.43 billion e. The low level of the
British revenue points out the residualism of the British welfare state and the importance of
private social insurance. Due to the low income thresholds of GR-Sim., as explained in section
4.2.1, the level of the revenue components is distorted.
GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Revenue
Taxes 18,36 30,43 16,49 19,12
Employee Contributions 14,96 7,09 9,78 10,41
Employer Contributions 14,96 1,55 7,59 13,03
Total 48,28 39,07 33,86 42,56
Expenditure
Benefits 26,32 26,16 26,13 26,20
Table 7: National Budget of the Computations with EUROMOD, Values in Billion Euros
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and Stata.
One aim of a nancing system can be the achievement of a more equitable income distri-
bution.84 It is often assumed that social contributions have a tendency to create more unequal
83Cf. Saez (2002).
84Cf. Musgrave and Musgrave (1989). The distributional impacts of taxes and social contributions are not
35income distributions than income taxes because they are, in general, more regressive. In ad-
dition, only people with a job are covered by the social insurance based on contributions, and
when considering employer's contributions, a discrimination against labour in favour of capital
results. But the distributional eects also depend on the design of the social contribution sys-
tem. The closer the system is to the system of general taxation in terms of progressivity, the
more similar the distributional consequences will probably be.
In the next sections, the three simulated systems are compared with the baseline system of
Germany 2003.
5.1.1 Implementing the Danish Financing System
Figure 4 presents the tax payments per decile for the baseline and the simulated systems. In
DK-Sim., the deciles ve to ten pay much higher taxes than in every other system. Due to the
high Danish tax rates, i.e. e.g. a top rate of 60.45 per cent, a household pays 309 e more on
average taxes than in the baseline system GE-2003 and the last decile even pays 927 e more
per month. Also the lower income deciles pay higher taxes but the absolute growth of the tax
payments from the baseline to the simulated Danish system DK-Sim. is especially high for the
upper deciles as shown in gure 5 On average, the taxes increase by 65.75 per cent. The change
of tax payments shows that more redistribution takes place in the tax system of DK-Sim.
the only eects of taxation. Although eciency aspects will not be addressed in this thesis, they have to be kept
in mind, especially because they can be in opposition to equity eects as well as to administrative simplicity. To
guarantee administrative feasibility, a system needs to be intelligible and provide low option for abuse, which
is in con
ict with horizontal equity and tax systems trying to take factors like age or family size into account,
cf. Barr (1992). To be able to evaluate the functioning of a welfare state system, all its objectives have to be










GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Figure 4: Income Taxes per Decile
Source: Own illustration.
These results can be ascribed to the high tax rates applied to high and low income earners
on the one hand, and to the low tax-free amount of the Danish system, on the other hand. The
tax-exempt amount is 4,487 e, compared to 7,235 e in the German system. The Danish tax













Figure 5: Absolute Change of Tax Payments per Decile from GE-2003 to DK-Sim.
Source: Own illustration.
37Considering the employee social contributions paid per decile in gure 6 completely changes
the picture. The amount of contributions an average household has to pay in the baseline
system (383 e) is more than twice as high as in the Danish system (181 e). The low rate
of the Danish general contributions of eight per cent yields almost no contribution payments
for the lower income deciles, although there is no income threshold in DK-Sim., below which














GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Figure 6: Employee Social Contributions per Decile
Source: Own illustration.
In DK-Sim., almost no employer contributions have to be paid, i.e. just 40 e on average,
compared to 383 e in GE-2003, which results from the very low rate of two per cent, whereas













GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Figure 7: Employer Social Contributions per Decile
Source: Own illustration.
The distribution of the disposable incomes in gure 8 and 9 shows that a lot of redistribution
takes place in DK-Sim.: Despite the lower revenue generated in DK-Sim., the disposable income
of the upper deciles is comparatively low. Without accounting for the employer contributions,
it is even lower than in GE-2003 and in gure 9, it is just slightly above the disposable income
of GE-2003. Independent of the employer contributions, the disposable income of the lower









GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Figure 8: Disposable Income per Decile Without Accounting for Employer Contributions
Source: Own illustration.
Greve (1996) argued that a welfare state nanced out of general taxation seems to have
the best possibility in achieving the goal of greater equity.85 This argument can be supported
referring to the Gini-coecient of the disposable income listed in table 8 and 9, which is lower
for the Danish system compared to the baseline scenario. Surprisingly, introducing the Danish
system leads to greater poverty. The German benet system does not compensate for the
high taxation of the lower income groups, which is done by the Danish benet system. The
same argument holds for the high child poverty rate. Especially families with low incomes
are aected by the high rates of the lowest tax bracket and are not compensated within the
German benet system. The poverty rate of the elderly decreases from 15.8 per cent in the
baseline to 12 per cent in table 8 This can be attributed to the exemption of pension incomes
in the Danish taxable income. In Denmark, just private pensions are part of the tax base to
increase the advantages of public social security. Contrarily, German pensioners have to pay
contributions for the public health and the statutory long-term care insurance.86
85Cf. Greve (1996), p. 67.
86Accounting for the employer contributions and keeping the poverty line xed yields an even lower poverty
rate for the elderly and lower poverty rates for all simulated systems. This eect results from the higher
disposable income of the simulated systems, although they also realise smaller revenue. On the other hand,
adapting the poverty line to the higher disposable incomes overestimates the poverty rates, especially in DK-
Sim., where almost no employer contributions have to be paid. This increases the disposable incomes and thus
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Figure 9: Disposable Income per Decile Accounting for Employer Contributions
Source: Own illustration.
The implementation of a Danish benet system would be combined with high costs, which
becomes obvious when considering the disposable income especially of the richer households of
the simulated Danish system. In the EUROMOD tables of 2001, an average Danish household
receives benets at a level of 874 e per month, which is far above the EU15 average of 630 e
and the highest level of all EU countries listed in these tables.87 Greve (1996) underlines that a
universal welfare state such as the Scandinavian model will have more diculties in the future
due to open borders, market competition and the resulting pressure put on high-tax-countries.
Madsen (1999) alludes to potentially resulting internal problems for the Danish welfare state
that also exist in other welfare states, but could be worse in Denmark due to the high tax
burden, such as tax evasion, tax resistance and incentives for the black economy. He also
mentions that the increased mobility of goods, services and factors of production could lead to
scal pressure due to the mobility of the tax base, and towards a harmonisation of tax rates
across borders among the EU countries.
To sum up, in DK-Sim., more redistribution takes place than in GE-2003, due to the impor-
tance of tax payments in the revenue structure. The upper decile pay much more taxes, which
reduces inequality of incomes measured by the Gini-coecient. Contributions paid in DK-Sim.
are comparatively low, especially employer contributions, which reduces the redistributive ef-
fect.
87Cf. EUROMOD (2007a).
415.1.2 Implementing the British Financing System
In UK-Sim., the rst four deciles pay almost no taxes as in GE-2003. For the fth and sixth
decile, tax payments are higher than in GE-2003, which is the other way around for the last
deciles. These results can be ascribed to the more progressive tax schedule of GE-2003.88
The taxes paid by an average household in UK-Sim. are 48 e lower than in GE-2003. The
composition of the national budget of UK-Sim. points out the relative importance of the taxes
in the nancing structure. Despite the much lower total revenue of UK-Sim., the revenue
generated through taxes is almost as high as in GE-2003.
The average employee contributions paid decrease by 35 per cent. Referring to the much
lower contribution rates of eleven per cent paid in UK-Sim. in contrast to 21 per cent in GE-
2003, this result was foreseeable, even though the contribution rates of UK-Sim. and thus the
payments are overestimated.89 Contrarily to the contributions paid in GE-2003, the lowest
four deciles almost pay no contributions, due to the higher income threshold of 127.9 e per
week which corresponds to 548 e per month, below which no contributions are levied. This
amount is always exempt from contributions irrespective of a persons' income. In the German
system, an income below 400 e a month is free of contributions, but on every income above this
allowance, the 
at-rate contributions are levied on every single e, which increases the payments
of the poor.
Figure 6 shows that the relative increase of contribution payments of the upper ve deciles
is higher than in GE-2003. This increase can be attributed to the fact that the self-employed
in GE-2003 do not have to pay contributions, whereas in UK-Sim. they have to, and many
self-employed are high income earners.
The distribution of the employer contributions in UK-Sim. is quite similar, except that
the increase of contributions paid by the upper deciles is not as high as for the employee
contributions, since there are no employers contributions for the self-employed.
The disposable income in UK-Sim. has risen in comparison to the baseline system and is
not much below the original income. The lower tax and contribution payments and the high
benets received by an average household give rise to a high disposable income. The residual
UK welfare state provides fewer benets on average than the German one and thus needs less
nancing. For the average British earner in 2003 the average benets were 564 e per month,
compared to 673 e for the German 2003 system. Figure 10 presents the absolute change of
the disposable incomes per decile after the introduction of UK-Sim. The disposable income
increases especially with the upper deciles compared to GE-2003.
88For a comparison of progressivity measures across EU countries, see Peichl and Schaefer (2008).












Figure 10: Absolute Increase of Disposable Income per Decile in UK-Sim.
Source: Own illustration.
These increases in disposable income yield a much higher Gini-coecient of UK-Sim. (0.2779
and 0.2711) than of the baseline system GE-2003 (0.2682). Thus inequality has increased due
to the British nancing system. Similarly, poverty has augmented from 13 to 15.7 per cent
(or 16.2 per cent, when accounting for employers contributions) of the population having an
equivalised disposable income of less than 60 per cent of the median. Especially child poverty
has increased from 15.5 to 20.6 per cent. These eects are due to the lower social contribution
and tax payments made on average in UK-Sim. This results in higher disposable incomes and
therefore a higher median and a higher poverty threshold. However, these eects can also be
attributed to the higher progressivity of the nancing system of GE-2003.90
90Cf. Peichl and Schaefer (2008). They do not only measure a higher progressivity of the tax schedule, but
also accounting for social contributions.
43Poverty (Headcount) GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Population 13,0% 13,9% 15,7% 15,3%
Children 15,5% 18,4% 20,6% 19,6%
Working Age (WA) 11,5% 13,1% 14,0% 13,5%
WA Econ. Act. 7,2% 9,6% 9,4% 8,9%
Elderly 15,8% 12,0% 16,3% 16,9%
Inequality (Gini) GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Original Income 0,4936 0,4936 0,4936 0,4936
Disposable income 0,2682 0,2496 0,2779 0,2816
Table 8: Poverty and Inequality of the Baseline and the Simulated Systems Without Accounting
for Employer Contributions
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD.
Poverty (Headcount), 
Fixed Poverty Line
GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Population 13,0% 11,1% 9,8% 14,3%
Children 15,5% 14,2% 12,8% 19,4%
Working Age (WA) 11,5% 10,3% 8,7% 13,4%
Elderly 15,8% 10,8% 10,4% 12,0%
Poverty (Headcount), 
Adapted Poverty Line
GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Population 13,0% 16,4% 16,2% 16,5%
Children 15,5% 20,9% 21,1% 22,2%
Working Age (WA) 11,5% 14,9% 14,1% 15,3%
Elderly 15,8% 16,9% 18,2% 14,6%
Inequality (Gini) GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Original Income 0,4936 0,4936 0,4936 0,4936
Disposable income 0,2682 0,2600 0,2711 0,2884
Table 9: Poverty and Inequality of the Baseline and the Simulated Systems Accounting for
Employer Contributions
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD.
As mentioned in section 2, the Liberal welfare states just provide a residual public social
security. Their approach of social insurance is more market-based, and less income is distributed
from the rich to the poor by the public system. Thus, the introduction of a Liberal nancing
system enhances inequality and poverty.
5.1.3 Implementing the Greek Financing System
As already mentioned in previous sections, the quantity of welfare provided by the Greek system
is low compared to other European countries. Just considering the nancial part of the welfare
44system and keeping the German benets thus results in a high disposable income that is close
to the original income.
Surprisingly, the tax payments in the simulated Greek system are even slightly higher, and
they are almost similarly distributed among the deciles as those of GE-2003. Referring to the
comparatively low tax payments of the original Greek system of 2003 presented in table 19 of
the annex to this section, this outcome was not predictable. Only the tenth decile pays lower
taxes because of the higher top rate in GE-2003.
The simulation of the Greek nancing system, based on German data, changes the structure
of the system completely. Average social contribution payments in the original Greek system
of 2003 are much higher (207 e) than the average tax payments (147 e). Due to the German
population, average contributions of 274 e are higher in GR-Sim., but lower than the average
tax payment of 486 e. One minor reason for the high tax payments might be the inclusion of
pension in the Greek tax base, but the major reason is the lower standard of living in Greece.
The tax schedule, being adjusted to the lower level of wages in Greece, sorts more households
into the upper tax brackets, when realised on the basis of German data. The opposite distortions
as to the tax schedule apply to the social contribution schedule.
The social contributions of the Greek nancing system, implemented in Germany, are com-
paratively low, which can be ascribed to three causes: 1) The employee contribution rate of
GR-Sim. is lower than the German one. A Greek employee has to pay 16 per cent plus 3.45 per
cent for hazardous workers. These are blue collar workers in certain occupations which are less
represented in the German than in the Greek database. Therefore, in GR-Sim., more people
just pay the 16 per cent than in GR-2003, in which 40 per cent of the employees contribute
19.45 per cent.91 2) The income ceiling for the assessment of contributions in GR-Sim. is far
below the ceiling in GE-2003, i.e. 1,960.25 e in GR-Sim., and 3,450 e in Germany for the
health insurance, and even 3,850 e Eastern German and 4,600 e Western German income
ceiling for the pension and disability insurance. Due to the lower market incomes of the Greek
population,92 less burden is loaded on the Greek population. In particular the Greek social
contribution schedule is adapted to the lower economic status of the population. In GE-2003,
the average market income is much higher. Thus, the richer households now have to pay less
contributions and only on income up to the lower ceiling.93 3) Contributions paid by the self-
91Cf. Matsaganis and Tsakloglou (2004), p. 33. The amount of hazardous workers in GR-Sim. is a bit
underestimated, because not all German households are labelled with the International Standard Classication
of Occupations (ISCO) number. The social contributions paid by the lower income households are therefore a
little bit underestimated.
92See GR-2003 displayed in table 19 in the annex to section 4.
93It could be considered as a drawback that the structure of the Greek nancing system has not been adopted
to German standards, but this has not been done on purpose. As mentioned in previous sections, the Southern
countries feature a nancing structure that is close to the structure of the conservative countries, but they
provide a lower level of welfare. Therefore the system has been implemented with all its default values.
45employed in GR-Sim. are comparatively high and the number of self-employed and farmers in
the German population is low compared to the Greek one. There are 1,916 self-employed in
the Greek database and 514 in the German one. The distribution of the employee contribution
payments is quite similar to the distribution of GE-2003. The increase of contribution for the
upper deciles is just slightly lower due to the lower income ceiling in the GR-Sim..
Considering the distribution of the employer contributions, unlike in GE-2003, no contri-
butions are paid by the lower deciles. The employer contributions paid in the GE-2003 are
those for the health insurance paid by the pension fund. The distribution of the employer
contributions in the upper deciles in GR-Sim. has a more concave trend because of the lower
income ceiling and the higher contribution rate of 28 per cent plus 3.15 for hazardous workers
compared to 21 per cent in GE-2003.
The Gini-coecient in the simulated Greek system is the highest of all four systems. Re-
garding the change of disposable income from GE-2003 to GR-Sim., gives the explanation. The
lower income earners are the losers and the upper income earners the winners in terms of dis-
posable income. Therefore, the richer households save more money now, which is mainly due
to the lower rate and lower income ceiling for the contribution payments. Less redistribution















Figure 11: Absolute Change of Disposable Income of GR-Sim.
Source: Own illustration.
Table 9 shows an increase of the overall poverty from 13 to 16.1 %. The same explanations
as for the growth of inequality are valid to explain this result. In addition, due to the higher
46disposable incomes, the poverty threshold has risen, which also explains the higher tax amount
paid by the poor.94 Especially the poverty rate of the elderly has grown which results from the
dierent tax base. In Germany, only civil servants' pensions are part of the taxable income,
whereas the Greek system levies taxes on all pensions.
Concerning the revenue generated by GR-Sim., it should be kept in mind that for the
lower level of welfare provided in the Southern welfare states, in terms of benets granted, less
nancing is needed. However, it is much too low to nance German benets.
Regarding the shares of social contributions and taxes paid per decile in each system, as
presented in gure 12, shows that there are some tendencies concerning the distribution of
shares according to whether a system relies more on taxes or social contributions. The shares
of the Bismarckian systems of GE-2003 and GR-Sim. are comparatively higher for the lower
deciles and lower for the upper deciles. This could lead to the conclusion that concerning the
nancing structure, Beveridgean systems such as DK-Sim. and UK-Sim. have more potential
to redistribute. However, because of the low tax and contribution rates, and the lower revenue
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Figure 12: Share of Social Contributions and Taxes Paid per Decile
Source: Own illustration.
94 See table 13 and 25 of the annex of this section.
475.2 Eects on Labour Costs and on Labour Supply Incentives
After having analysed the distributional eects of the three simulated reform scenarios, the
eects on labour costs measured by the AETRs and on intensive labour supply incentives in
terms of the METRs are evaluated for the simulated nancing systems.95 The evaluation of the
eective tax rates will mainly focus on the median rates since they are less sensitive to extreme
values. Similar to the analysis above, the results of the simulated systems are compared to the
baseline system GE-2003.
5.2.1 AETRs and METRs of the Danish Financing System
The overall median AETR of DK-Sim. is by eleven percentage points lower than the one of GE-
2003, although the tax payments of the Danish system are signicantly higher, as displayed
in gure 4. The high level of the average German AETR can be attributed to the higher
contributions paid by the employees and the employers in Germany, which imposes higher
costs on labour than the Danish income tax just paid by the employees. The dierence of
the median AETRs of the two systems is much bigger for the lower than for the upper income
deciles. For the rst two deciles, the AETRs of GE-2003 are three times higher than the Danish
ones. This result supports the point of view of many economists that especially low income
receivers are charged by the high tax and contribution wedge in Germany.96 Whether the high
labour costs aect labour demand is often discussed. Leibfritz et al. (1997) argue that labour
costs, in particular social contributions paid by employers, have a strong in
uence on labour
demand and thus unemployment. Notwithstanding, the results of the empirical study of Bauer
and Riphahn (2002) indicate low eects of social contributions on labour demand. It can be
concluded that DK-Sim. imposes lower labour costs on lower income workers and increases
their incentive to participate in the labour market. Due to the high top income tax rate of
DK-Sim., the median AETR of the last decile is higher than in GE-2003. Since in DK-Sim.,
a lower revenue is realised, it can be assumed that the AETRs would be higher in general, if
considering a revenue-neutral reform scenario.
Regarding the intensive labour supply incentives in terms of the METRs changes the picture
somewhat. The overall median METR of DK-Sim. (0.46) is almost the same as the METR
of GE-2003 (0.46).97 Taking a closer look at the distribution along the deciles reveals that the
95The median and average eective tax rates of each system are listed in the annex to this section. There
will always be behavioural reactions when introducing new taxes, or elevating, or lowering, existing ones. These
reactions should not be underestimated and it has to be kept in mind that they are not covered by EUROMOD.
Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that the simulated systems are not revenue-neutral.
96Cf. Sinn (2005b) or Sinn (2005a) and Schr oder (2006).
97Homburg (2003) presents some reform options for the often discussed problem that low income earnings
are confronted with high marginal tax rates in Germany and shows analytically that these options do not have
the desired impact on welfare.
48deciles nine and ten of DK-Sim. are confronted with much higher METRs, i.e. 0.65, than the
respective deciles of GE-2003 (0.49 and 0.47). Consequently, an additional hour of work leaves
an high-income employee in DK-Sim. with less additional disposable income than in GE-2003.
This results from the fact that the Danish nancing system mainly relies on income taxation,
whereas in the German system social contributions play a major role. In DK-Sim., high-income
earners have to pay additional taxes on the marginal increase of their wage. Contrarily, social
insurances in GE-2003 are only paid up to an income ceiling and thus have a regressive schedule.
The rst two deciles are also aected by an increase of the METRs due to the high tax rate of
39.45 per cent of the lowest tax bracket of DK-Sim. To sum up, the nancing system DK-Sim.,
relying more on income taxation, reduces the labour costs, but lowers labour supply incentives,
especially of the upper and lower deciles.
GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
0,52 0,41 0,33 0,39
GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
0,47 0,46 0,38 0,40
Overall Median METR
Overall Median AETR
Table 10: Overall Median Eective Tax Rates









GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Figure 13: Median Average Eective Tax Rates per Decile
Source: Own illustration.
495.2.2 AETRs and METRs of the British Financing System
The simulation of the British nancing system yields the lowest overall median AETRs and
METRs. Due to the low social contribution payments and the low tax payments of the employ-
ees in UK-Sim., the labour costs, i.e. the extensive labour supply incentives, are on a low level
compared to the other systems. As a result of the high tax-exempt income and the relatively
high contribution-free amount, labour costs are especially low for the low-income earners. For
the same reason, the intensive labour supply incentives are very high for the lowest two deciles.
The AETRs increase slightly with the higher deciles. The median METRs vary a bit between
the dierent deciles but remain almost on the average level of 38 per cent. Thus, the incentives
for an employee to augment hours of working are almost the same for every income earner.
Consequently, the decision to work more is not distorted between dierent wage levels. The
intensive labour supply incentives are especially high for the rst two deciles and slightly lower










GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Figure 14: Median Marginal Eective Tax Rates per Decile
Source: Own illustration.
5.2.3 AETRs and METRs of the Greek Financing System
On the basis of the higher wage level in the German population, the relation of tax and con-
tribution payments in GR-Sim. has distorted the structure of the original Greek nancing
system. This leads to AETRs and METRs that are just partially comparable with the eective
tax rates of those that would result from the original Greek system. The comparatively low
50level of AETRs mainly results from the lower level of nancing that takes place in GR-Sim.
Despite these drawbacks, it is interesting to see how a drastic reduction of social contribution
payments aects the labour costs.
The structural distribution of the AETRs of GR-Sim. is similar to the AETRs of GE-2003,
but on a lower level. Only the deciles two and three show larger dierences between the labour
costs because of the lower tax-exempt amount of GE-2003 and the higher tax rate of the rst
tax bracket.
The intensive labour supply incentives are on a constant level for the rst three decile
groups because of the high tax-exempt income amount of GR-Sim., which explains the large
step between decile three and four. The following deciles are also confronted with additional tax
payments when extending working hours. Compared to GE-2003, the rst decile of GR-Sim.
is confronted with a higher METR and thus fewer incentives to work more, which results from
the fact that in GR-Sim. social insurance contributions have to be paid already on the rst e
earned.
To sum up, the labour costs in terms of the AETRs in the original German system are
the highest on average, and they are especially high for the lower income deciles. A reduction
of social contribution payments yields lower labour costs, in particular for the lower income
earners. A high level of income taxation as in DK-Sim. reduces overall labour costs on the one
hand, but increases the METRs for the lower and upper deciles. The simulated Liberal British
nancing system displays the lowest labour costs and gives the highest incentives to labour
supply to increase working hours, but it also generates the lowest revenue of all the simulated
systems.
Concerning the distribution of the AETRs, their level is lower for the lower deciles in a
nancing system relying more on income taxation, i.e. DK-Sim. and UK-Sim., and it increases
more for the upper deciles than in the Bismarckian systems GE-2003 and GR-Sim.
Regarding the distribution of the METRs, there seems to be a tendency that the Beveridgean
systems DK-Sim. and UK-Sim. provide comparatively low rates for the lower income deciles
but higher rates for the upper deciles. However, considering the Danish case, for which the
METRs of the lower deciles are elevated, this eect also depends strongly on the tax-exempt
amount and the lowest tax rate.
516 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was the analysis of dierent simulated nancing systems for Germany.
Section 2 gave an overview of typologies of welfare states in the technical literature for Europe.
The four most often mentioned welfare states types, namely the Conservative, the Social-
democratic, the Liberal, and the Southern model, and their characteristics have been described.
In section 3, the nancing systems of the respective models have been worked out. Moreover,
for each of the four models, a representative country has been chosen, whose income tax system
and social contribution system have been presented in detail. Section 4 brie
y introduced the
microsimulation model EUROMOD and illustrated the methodology used. Afterwards, the
results of the simulated Danish, British and Greek nancing system for Germany, keeping the
German benet system, have been analysed. More precisely, the previous section presented the
eects on the income distribution and on labour supply incentives by these simulations.
However, several drawbacks of the presented results should be kept in mind: First, the
simulated reform scenarios are not revenue-neutral, thus not comparable one-by-one. Second,
the benet side of the welfare state, which might enhance or dampen these eects, has been
neglected. Third, the simulated systems do not account for behavioural reactions of the eco-
nomic agents, such as tax evasion, and for adjustment processes. Fifth, tax competition could
put pressure on the level of income taxes. Sixth, distortionary eects associated with company
taxation or capital taxation are not considered. Thus, the above-listed results have to be eval-
uated cautiously, keeping these restrictions in mind.98 Despite these constraints the following
conclusions can be drawn:
The introduction of the Social-democratic Danish nancing system decreases inequality of
incomes, but does not necessarily lead to less poverty. Tax payments are extremely high,
whereas social contribution payments are relatively low. As a result, the distribution of the
household disposable income shows comparatively high levels for the lower deciles and low levels
for the upper deciles. These results demonstrate the strong redistributive eects of the Danish
nancing structure. The labour costs measured in terms of AETRs decrease, especially for
low-income earners, but are higher for the last decile. Contrarily, the intensive labour supply
incentives, displayed by the high level of the METRs, decrease for low and high-income earners.
The higher METRs the lower deciles are confronted with result from the high tax rates of the
lowest bracket.
The introduction of a Liberal British nancing system reduces equality and increases poverty.
The revenue generated by this system is the lowest of all simulated systems. Since the Liberal
welfare states heavily rely on private insurance, social contributions paid are comparatively
98A reform within a welfare state system must additionally to the eect of the nancing (and benet) levels
and structures on the income distribution consider eciency and sustainability.
52low. The extensive labour supply incentives are high on average (low AETRs) and especially
for the lower deciles. The intensive labour supply incentives are almost constant and on a
comparatively high level, except for the rst two deciles where they are extremely high, and
for the last decile, where they are slightly lower (higher METR).
The introduction of the Southern Greek system yields higher inequality and poverty due
to the low income thresholds, which lead to higher disposable incomes of the rich and lower
disposable incomes of the poor. The average extensive and intensive labour supply incentives
are higher for the simulated Greek system than for the original German one, which can be
ascribed to the lower revenue generated by the Greek nancing system. The distributional
structure of the eective tax rates along the deciles shows similarities to the original German
system just on lower levels.
In general, some tendencies can be seen, which result from the nancing structure: The
share of contribution and tax payments is higher for the upper decile groups and lower for
the rst deciles in the systems relying more on income taxation, i.e. the Danish and British
Beveridgean systems, in comparison to the Bismarckian nancing systems of Germany and
Greece. They thus seem to have more potential to redistribute, but, as it can be seen in the
case of the British nancing system, the level of redistribution also depends strongly on the
level of payments. Concerning the distribution of the AETRs, their level is higher for the
lower deciles in the Bismarckian systems, and it increases less for the upper deciles than in
the Beveridgean systems. According to this, fewer extensive labour supply incentives for the
lower income groups prevail in the Conservative and Southern nancing systems. Regarding
the distribution of the METRs, there seems to be a tendency that the Beveridgean systems
provide comparatively high rates for the upper deciles compared to the Bismarckian systems.
Due to the fact that tax schedules are progressive and social contribution schedules are linear
or even regressive, changing a nancing system towards more income taxation increases the
extra payments of the richest of the population for an additional hour of work.
The simulation results do not support Stefan Collignon's point of view that the Conservative
welfare state completely failed. Taking the level of welfare and the level of inequality and
poverty into account that are achieved by these types of welfare states, their systems seem to
be quite successful. On the other hand regarding labour costs and labour supply incentives,
the structure of the nancing system has decits. It is certain that reforms are needed, not
only on the nancing, but also on the benet side of the welfare state to be able to cope with
the challenges of the present and the future.
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59A Annex to Section 2
A.1 Overview of Typologies
Author Typologies Criteria Characteristics of each type Countries
Socio-democratic  
high degree of 
decommodification
 Sweden, Norway, Denmark
Liberal








system of universalism, focus 
on employment
Sweden, Norway, Denmark 
and Finland
Bismarck
system of income compensation 




residualism, focus on growth, 
force to work through market
USA, Australia, New 
Zealand, England
Latin Rim
rudimentary, to some parts 
residual, influence of Catholic 
Church in the labour market
Spain, Portugal, Italy, 
Greece, France
Targeted
means-test, minimum and 





supported by tax money provide 




eligibility for earnings-related 
benefits based on contributions 
and occupational category
Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy
Basic Security
eligibility based on citizenship or 
contributions, flat-rate benefits 
or a low ceiling on earnings 
replacement
Canada, Denmark, the 





eligibility based on contributions 
and citizenship, universal 
programs covering all citizens
Finland, Norway, Sweden
Anglo-Saxon
low percentage of contributions 




high percentage of contributions 
(Bismarck), high expenditure 
level
Germany, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands
Nordic
low percentage of contributions 
(Beveridge), high expenditure 
level
Sweden, Finland, Denmark, 
Norway
Southern
high percentage of contributions 
(Bismarck), low expenditure 
level
Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Portugal, Switzerland
Anglo-Saxon
social assistance based on 




social entitlements depend on 
employment and family state, 
benefits areproportional to 
income and financed through 
contributions, strong influence 
of unions and employer 
organisations on insurance 
schemes




universal coverage with 
generous benefits financed 
through fiscal revenues
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, 
Finland
Southern
fragmented and dualistic system 
of income maintenance 
depending on employment 
state, no minimum income 
scheme, financing through 
contributions, universal health 
insurance, clientelism and 
particularism, 





strategies of equality: eligibility, 
benefit level principle
percentage of social expenditure 
financed through contributions, 
expenditure as percentage of GDP
eligibility criteria, financing structure, 
organisational structure and lobbyism




Table 11: Overview of Typologies and Methodologies Used in the Literature
Source: Based on Arts and Gelissen (2002)
60B Annex to Section 3
B.1 Financing Systems
Germany Denmark United Kingdom Greece
Tax System
Lowest Tax Rate 19,9 39,45 10 15
Highest Tax Rate 48,5 60,45 40 40
Number of Tax Brackets formula 3 3 3














Employment income and 










Lowest Income Limit below 
which no Payment
400 € - 548,14 € -
Income Ceiling above which no 
Payments 
3450 € for health insurance, 
4600 €  (3850 € for Eastern 
Germany) for pension and 
unemployment insurance 
- 3.664,50 € 1.960,25 €
Employees 21 % on total
8% as general 
contributions
11%
16% plus 3.45% for 
hazardous workers
Employers paying for their 
Employees
21 % on total
2% as general 
contributions
12,8%
28% plus 3.15% for 
hazardous workers
Self-employed Voluntarily
8% as general 
contributions
8%
53 € per month in the pre-
1993 system and 62 € on 
average for the post-1993 
system
Civil-servants Do not pay No seperate contributions No seperate contributions 16,22%
Farmers
Special farmer's pension fund, 
public health insurance
No seperate contributions No seperate contributions
Amount should be equal to 
8.5%
Table 12: Financing Systems of Germany, Denmark, the UK and Greece
Source: Own illustration based on EUROMOD data.














1 745 232 186 560 1 46
2 1.162 622 561 703 23 139
3 1.457 1.066 1.007 721 83 247
4 1.687 1.357 1.304 776 138 307
5 1.970 1.829 1.757 766 231 395
6 2.157 2.242 2.156 706 326 465
7 2.390 2.621 2.514 700 432 500
8 2.803 3.406 3.277 629 635 597
9 3.324 4.231 4.062 657 929 635
10 4.736 6.671 6.153 562 1.912 586
All 2.221 2.400 2.269 673 470 383
Poor* 811 282 232 589 3 57
Table 13: Mean of Income and Income-Components per Decile Group According to Disposable
Income, GE-2003













1 4,1% 1,2% 1,0% 10,2% 0,0% 1,5%
2 5,5% 2,7% 2,6% 11,0% 0,5% 3,8%
3 6,3% 4,3% 4,3% 10,3% 1,7% 6,2%
4 7,2% 5,4% 5,5% 11,0% 2,8% 7,6%
5 8,0% 6,8% 6,9% 10,2% 4,4% 9,3%
6 9,1% 8,7% 8,9% 9,8% 6,5% 11,4%
7 10,5% 10,7% 10,8% 10,2% 9,0% 12,8%
8 12,3% 13,8% 14,0% 9,1% 13,1% 15,1%
9 14,8% 17,4% 17,7% 9,6% 19,5% 16,4%
10 22,3% 29,0% 28,3% 8,7% 42,5% 16,0%
Poor* 5,7% 1,8% 1,6% 13,6% 0,1% 2,3%
Table 14: Share of Income and Income-Components received/paid by each Decile Group Ac-
cording to Disposable Income, GE-2003













1 950 377 335 892 264 55
2 1.416 522 452 1.397 436 68
3 1.742 1.021 951 1.458 602 135
4 2.118 1.920 1.839 1.192 767 228
5 2.539 2.935 2.852 987 1.047 337
6 2.851 3.780 3.691 775 1.272 431
7 3.147 4.623 4.488 555 1.522 509
8 3.360 5.101 5.007 484 1.666 559
9 3.798 6.199 6.069 375 2.123 653
10 5.699 10.831 9.794 263 4.405 990
All 2.611 3.413 3.240 874 1.312 364
Poor* 945 375 335 886 261 56
Table 15: Mean of Income and Income-Components per Decile Group According to Disposable
Income, DK-2001













1 5,0% 1,5% 1,4% 14,1% 2,8% 2,1%
2 6,9% 1,9% 1,8% 20,2% 4,2% 2,4%
3 7,4% 3,3% 3,2% 18,4% 5,1% 4,1%
4 7,8% 5,4% 5,5% 13,1% 5,6% 6,0%
5 8,4% 7,4% 7,6% 9,8% 6,9% 8,0%
6 9,1% 9,2% 9,5% 7,4% 8,1% 9,9%
7 10,1% 11,4% 11,6% 5,3% 9,7% 11,7%
8 11,5% 13,4% 13,9% 5,0% 11,4% 13,8%
9 13,4% 16,8% 17,3% 4,0% 14,9% 16,6%
10 20,4% 29,6% 28,2% 2,8% 31,3% 25,4%
Poor* 4,8% 1,5% 1,4% 13,6% 2,7% 2,1%
Table 16: Share of Income and Income-Components received/paid by each Decile Group Ac-
cording to Disposable Income, DK-2001













1 903 181 104 826 101 3
2 1.280 509 390 925 134 20
3 1.458 768 587 892 168 34
4 1.753 1.274 1.047 789 245 65
5 2.060 1.862 1.529 632 334 100
6 2.431 2.433 2.086 571 431 142
7 2.820 3.195 2.708 380 570 185
8 3.349 4.090 3.623 271 762 250
9 4.015 5.159 4.661 190 1.009 326
10 6.231 8.706 7.778 141 2.202 413
All 2.628 2.816 2.451 564 599 153
Poor* 1.023 274 186 865 109 8
Table 17: Mean of Income and Income-Components per Decile Group According to Disposable
Income, UK-2003













1 3,8% 0,7% 0,5% 16,0% 1,8% 0,2%
2 4,7% 1,8% 1,6% 16,0% 2,2% 1,3%
3 5,8% 2,8% 2,5% 16,5% 2,9% 2,3%
4 6,5% 4,4% 4,2% 13,7% 4,0% 4,2%
5 7,7% 6,5% 6,1% 10,9% 5,4% 6,3%
6 8,8% 8,2% 8,1% 9,6% 6,8% 8,8%
7 10,6% 11,2% 10,9% 6,6% 9,4% 1,9%
8 12,3% 14,1% 14,3% 4,6% 12,3% 15,8%
9 15,1% 18,1% 18,8% 3,3% 16,6% 21,0%
10 24,8% 32,3% 33,2% 2,6% 38,4% 28,2%
Poor* 6,6% 1,6% 1,3% 1,3% 3,1% 0,8%
Table 18: Share of Income and Income-Components received/paid by each Decile Group Ac-
cording to Disposable Income, UK-2003













1 351 200 173 189 0 38
2 705 475 430 307 1 75
3 845 540 494 404 5 93
4 1.000 716 661 418 10 124
5 1.238 975 908 452 30 159
6 1.459 1.224 1.156 491 51 205
7 1.703 1.548 1.481 493 82 256
8 1.975 1.904 1.833 533 149 312
9 2.334 2.372 2.285 565 227 376
10 3.609 4.365 4.172 639 923 471
All 1.502 1.411 1.339 445 147 207
Poor* 509 322 286 243 1 54
Table 19: Mean of Income and Income-Components per Decile Group According to Disposable
Income, GR-2003













1 2,6% 1,6% 1,4% 4,6% 0,0% 2,0%
2 4,6% 3,3% 3,1% 6,7% 0,1% 3,5%
3 6,0% 4,1% 3,9% 9,7% 0,4% 4,8%
4 7,2% 5,5% 5,3% 10,1% 0,8% 6,4%
5 8,1% 6,8% 6,7% 10,0% 2,0% 7,6%
6 9,1% 8,2% 8,1% 10,4% 3,2% 9,3%
7 10,5% 10,2% 10,3% 10,3% 5,2% 11,4%
8 12,4% 12,7% 12,9% 11,2% 9,5% 14,2%
9 15,2% 16,5% 16,7% 12,4% 15,1% 17,8%
10 24,3% 31,3% 31,6% 14,5% 63,7% 23,0%
Poor* 6,9% 4,6% 4,3% 11,0% 0,1% 5,3%
Table 20: Share of Income and Income-Components received/paid by each Decile Group Ac-
cording to Disposable Income, GR-2003













1 718 393 323 434 76 26
2 1.141 772 720 613 173 58
3 1.464 1.318 1.260 614 344 101
4 1.628 1.438 1.385 708 381 111
5 1.855 1.823 1.751 721 517 140
6 2.084 2.197 2.116 737 642 169
7 2.278 2.666 2.573 684 820 206
8 2.636 3.246 3.094 732 1.037 248
9 2.902 3.940 3.764 671 1.341 301
10 3.961 6.002 5.538 821 2.333 443
All 2.069 2.400 2.269 669 779 181
Poor* 799 435 369 486 85 30
Table 21: Mean of Income and Income-Components per Decile Group According to Disposable
Income, DK-Simulation













1 4,2% 2,0% 1,7% 7,8% 1,2% 1,7%
2 5,5% 3,2% 3,1% 9,1% 2,2% 3,1%
3 6,3% 4,9% 5,0% 8,2% 4,0% 5,0%
4 7,5% 5,7% 5,8% 10,0% 4,7% 5,8%
5 8,4% 7,1% 7,2% 10,1% 6,2% 7,2%
6 9,4% 8,6% 8,7% 10,3% 7,7% 8,7%
7 10,7% 10,8% 11,0% 9,9% 10,2% 11,0%
8 12,2% 12,9% 13,1% 10,5% 12,8% 13,1%
9 14,8% 17,4% 17,6% 10,6% 18,2% 17,6%
10 21,0% 27,4% 26,8% 13,5% 32,9% 26,8%
Poor* 6,2% 2,9% 2,6% 11,7% 1,8% 2,6%
Table 22: Share of Income and Income-Components received/paid by each Decile Group Ac-
cording to Disposable Income, DK-Simulation













1 771 259 207 534 9 12
2 1.184 629 571 663 54 54
3 1.533 1.021 959 735 118 105
4 1.794 1.339 1.281 775 174 146
5 2.108 1.723 1.650 814 236 194
6 2.336 2.203 2.118 712 323 257
7 2.625 2.615 2.507 723 409 304
8 3.080 3.387 3.249 639 561 385
9 3.553 4.123 3.952 651 757 464
10 5.022 6.635 6.159 504 1.524 593
All 2.396 2.400 2.269 669 422 250
Poor* 885 368 314 562 21 24
Table 23: Mean of Income and Income-Components per Decile Group According to Disposable
Income, UK-Simulation













1 3,8% 1,3% 1,1% 9,4% 0,3% 0,6%
2 5,2% 2,8% 2,6% 10,4% 1,4% 2,3%
3 6,1% 4,1% 4,1% 10,5% 2,7% 4,0%
4 7,1% 5,3% 5,4% 11,1% 3,9% 5,6%
5 8,0% 6,5% 6,6% 11,1% 5,1% 7,0%
6 9,1% 8,5% 8,7% 9,9% 7,1% 9,5%
7 10,5% 10,5% 10,6% 10,4% 9,3% 11,7%
8 12,2% 13,4% 13,6% 9,1% 12,6% 14,6%
9 15,0% 17,4% 17,6% 9,9% 18,2% 18,8%
10 22,9% 30,2% 29,7% 8,2% 39,5% 25,9%
Poor* 6,6% 2,8% 2,5% 15,1% 0,9% 1,7%
Table 24: Share of Income and Income-Components received/paid by each Decile Group Ac-
cording to Disposable Income, UK-Simulation













1 742 257 208 546 18 43
2 1.146 589 532 705 46 102
3 1.460 920 853 804 109 154
4 1.699 1.201 1.131 870 179 193
5 1.984 1.581 1.491 903 261 239
6 2.241 2.068 1.968 818 351 293
7 2.563 2.665 2.522 731 473 360
8 2.932 3.342 3.215 649 645 414
9 3.473 4.445 4.270 430 931 471
10 5.030 7.060 6.634 325 1.842 513
All 2.310 2.400 2.269 670 486 274
Poor* 849 343 289 586 23 58
Table 25: Mean of Income and Income-Components per Decile Group According to Disposable
Income, GR-Simulation













1 3,8% 1,3% 1,1% 9,6% 0,4% 1,9%
2 5,3% 2,6% 2,5% 11,1% 1,0% 3,9%
3 6,2% 3,7% 3,7% 11,7% 2,2% 5,5%
4 7,1% 4,9% 4,8% 12,6% 3,6% 6,8%
5 8,0% 6,2% 6,1% 12,6% 5,0% 8,2%
6 9,0% 8,0% 8,1% 11,4% 6,7% 10,0%
7 10,4% 10,5% 10,5% 10,3% 9,2% 12,3%
8 12,2% 13,4% 13,6% 9,3% 12,8% 14,5%
9 15,0% 18,5% 18,8% 6,4% 19,1% 17,2%
10 23,0% 31,0% 30,8% 5,1% 40,0% 19,8%
Poor* 6,4% 2,5% 2,2% 15,3% 0,8% 3,7%
Table 26: Share of Income and Income-Components received/paid by each Decile Group Ac-
cording to Disposable Income, GR-Simulation



















1 1.096 1.096 1 1.166 0 70 70
2 1.241 1.241 21 1.316 0 95 95
3 1.416 1.416 141 1.370 0 95 95
4 1.418 1.418 569 967 4 114 114
5 1.592 1.592 1.386 538 83 250 250
6 1.901 1.901 2.198 381 260 418 418
7 2.220 2.220 2.905 270 443 512 512
8 2.724 2.724 3.760 278 674 639 639
9 3.465 3.465 4.999 244 1.018 760 760
10 5.135 5.135 8.023 202 2.216 874 874
All 2.221 2.221 2.400 673 470 383 383
Table 27: Mean of Income and Income-Components per Decile Group According to Original
Income, GE-2003



















1 1.163 1.233 1 1.164 1 0 0
2 1.334 1.429 21 1.315 1 0 0
3 1.494 1.589 141 1.367 10 3 1
4 1.413 1.528 569 956 76 28 7
5 1.472 1.722 1.386 525 320 97 22
6 1.779 2.198 2.198 373 584 168 40
7 2.049 2.561 2.905 269 846 227 52
8 2.524 3.163 3.760 278 1.154 292 67
9 3.113 3.873 4.999 244 1.652 392 87
10 4.353 5.226 8.023 203 3.143 609 122
All 2.069 2.452 2.400 669 779 181 40
Table 28: Mean of Income and Income-Components per Decile Group According to Original
Income, DK-Simulation



















1 1.164 1.234 1 1.163 0 0 0
2 1.335 1.430 21 1.314 0 0 0
3 1.508 1.602 141 1.367 0 0 0
4 1.494 1.602 569 952 9 16 6
5 1.663 1.837 1.386 524 132 116 76
6 2.025 2.266 2.198 373 302 244 177
7 2.390 2.658 2.905 269 443 341 245
8 2.980 3.287 3.760 278 606 452 333
9 3.787 4.105 4.999 244 889 567 443
10 5.617 5.828 8.023 201 1.841 766 663
All 2.396 2.585 2.400 669 422 250 194
Table 29: Mean of Income and Income-Components per Decile Group According to Original
Income, UK-Simulation



















1 1.080 1.150 1 1.168 53 36 0
2 1.212 1.307 21 1.315 75 49 0
3 1.337 1.426 141 1.371 121 53 6
4 1.339 1.376 569 958 109 79 77
5 1.570 1.533 1.386 526 134 208 288
6 1.969 1.895 2.198 374 270 332 493
7 2.355 2.338 2.905 269 442 377 529
8 2.921 2.966 3.760 278 676 441 594
9 3.726 3.790 4.999 244 970 546 696
10 5.595 5.728 8.023 201 2.009 621 740
All 2.310 2.351 2.400 670 486 274 342
Table 30: Mean of Income and Income-Components per Decile Group According to Original
Income, GR-Simulation
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD.













Table 31: Average Eective Tax Rates, GE-2003













Table 32: Average Eective Tax Rates, DK-Sim.













Table 33: Average Eective Tax Rates, UK-Sim.













Table 34: Average Eective Tax Rates, GR-Sim.













Table 35: Marginal Eective Tax Rates, GE-2003













Table 36: Marginal Eective Tax Rates, DK-Sim.













Table 37: Marginal Eective Tax Rates, UK-Sim.













Table 38: Marginal Eective Tax Rates, GR-Sim.
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD.
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